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I am here to file a brief. When notified of the subject upon
which I was expected to speak I realized that my appearance
amounted to a reversal of the ordinary procedure in our courts.
Ordinarily the courts require by rule, or permit upon request the
filing of briefs by members of the Bar. I n obedience to the order
of this Association I fulfill a commission of furnishing a brief of
authorities upon the selected subject for future reference. I shall
strictly confine myself to the specific subject, asking, however, the
privilege of directing especial attention to a few outstanding facts
in the past history of the University. These declarations of principles, so clearly understood by the founders of the University,
are of such paramount importance that they should never be overlooked or forgotten by those who hereafter will wish to continue the
work of the founders. As Georgia-a
pioneer,-instituted
the
first State University, the principles which the fathers embodied
in the institution must be followed, if the destiny which our forefathers saw was possible and which they hoped and prayed and believed their descendants would accomplish, shall, indeed, become a
reality.
The legal history of the University does not, a s is generally
supposed, begin with the charter granted on January 25, 1785. It is
true that this charter antedates by several years any other establishment of higher institutions of learning by any government in any
American State,-a
fact which every Georgian may contemplate
with justifiable emotions of pride. The Act of 1785 gave to the
Georgia University system its actual existence a s a n entity. I t became a n artificial citizen of the State by the gift of corporate existc
ence by the Legislature. But in 1783, two years prior to the grant
of the charter in 1785, the Act of July 31, 1783 (Marbury & Crawford's Digest, p. 132) clearly demonstrated t h a t the leaders of
thought in Georgia and the patriots who manned its ship of state
had given much thought to the subject of education and were fully
convinced that the general diffusion of knowledge among all classes
cf people was essential to the happiness of the people a s well as to
the perpetuation of true democracy. The Act of 1783 referred to- "---.
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was "an Act for laying out the reserve land in the town of Augusta
into acre lots, the erecting of a n academy or seminary of learning,
and for other purposes therein mentioned." The Act recites t h a t in
1780 the Legislature, "taking into consideration the advantages that
must necessarily result from the encouragement of the town of Augusta," had passed a n Act for laying out the reserve of the public
land in and near said town into acre lots, and directing the same
t o be sold a t public outcry, and whereas the lots were laid out and
sold, but certain restrictions were not complied with, and the sales
had become null and void, and the lands again became vested in the
State, commissioners were named t o again sell the lots subject to
restrictions set forth in the act. By section 4 of the act, i t is provided: "And whereas a seminary of learning is greatly necessary
for the instruction of our youth, and ought to be one of the first
objects of attention, after the promotion of religion: Be i t further
enacted, That after the said commissioners have reserved one of the
first lots for building a house of worship to the Divine Being, by
whose blessing the independence of the United States has been
established, and a reserve of ten other principal lots for the public
uses-the
monies arising from such sales, after defraying the
charges for building said church, shall be, and they are hereby vested in the hands and power of said commissioners named a s aforesaid, a s trustees for the purpose of carrying into execution the intentions of this law, and for erecting a n academy or seminary of
learning a s aforesaid, their heirs and successors in office forever,
in trust for the sole use of the said church and academy o r seminary." In this act provision was made, accompanied by an appropriation of land,-the only asset the Commonulealth then possessed,
-to sustain and continue an academy long noted and noted in its
beneficence as "Richmond Academy." By this act provision was
also made for the establishment of academies in the towns of Washington and Waynesborough, upon like conditions with the academy
a t Augusta.
By "An Act for the laying out of two more counties to the westward, and pointing out the mode of granting the same," approved
February 25, 1784 (Watkin's Digest, p. 230), the counties of Franklin and Washington were created, i t being recited t h a t "this is necessary in order to strengthen this State and for the convenience of
its inhabitants t h a t new counties should be laid out and properly
settled." The territory embraced within the line "beginning a t the
Savannah river where the west line of Wilkes county strikes the
same, thence along the said line to the Cherokee corner, from thence
on the same direction t o the South branch of the Oconee river,
thence up said river to the head or source of the most southern
stream thereof, thence along the temporary line separating the Indian hunting ground to the northern branch of the Savannah river,
known by the name of Keowee, and down the said river t o the begin. shall be a county, and known by the name of Franklin.
ning,
The second county shall be bounded by a line beginning on the
Oconee river where the last mentioned line strikes the same, thence
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along t h a t river to where it strikes the former temporary line,
thence along the said line to the Cherokee corner, and from thence
t o the beginning: And all that tract of land included within the
aforesaid lines shall be a county, and known by the name of Washington." I n section XI1 of the act i t is declared: "That the county surveyors, immediately after the passing of this act, shall proceed to lay out in each county, twenty thousand acres of land of
the first quality, in separate tracts of five thousand acres each, for
the endowment of a college or seminary of learning, and which said
lands shall be vested in and granted in trusts t o his honor the
governor for the time being. And John Houston, James Habersham,
William Few, Joseph Clay, Abraham Baldwin, William Houston and
Nathan Brownson, esqrs., and their successors in office, who are
hereby nominated and appointed trustees for the said college or
seminary of learning, and empowered to do all such things a s t o
them shall appear requisite and necessary, to forward the establishment and progress of the same; and all vacancies shall be filled up
by the said trustees. And the said county surveyors shall, in six
months after passing of this act, make return t o the trustees hereinbefore mentioned, of regular plats of all such tracts, a s he shall
have laid out and surveyed by-virtue of this act." While the act of
1783, above referred to, contemplated the establishment of a n academy, i t will be noted that the act of 1784 contains the first expres-sion or intimation looking t o the establishment of a "college or
seminary of learning" State-wide in its benefit and influence, indicating that our forefathers had long appreciated the benefits of
popular education controlled by the State, call i t paternalistic, if
you will. I n pursuance of this act the eight tracts were laid out.
I n 1785, a s is universally known, the University had its birth
a s a potential citizen of the Commonwealth, a legitimate child of the
State, publicly acknowledged a s such, and by this charter charged
with "the general superintendence and regulation of the literature
of this State, and in particular of the public seat of learning," the
same being vested in the Senatus Academicus. Like Minerva from
the brain of Jupiter, i t sprang upon the arena accredited by the
State and by i t assigned to the most important duty in government,
because i t underlies all well-ordered governmentl-the proper training of its citizenry.
Without any apparent attempt a t display in the use of words
employed, t h e language of this charter i s heroic because there
breathes through every line the deepest sincerity a s well a s the
most profound and unalterable conviction a s to the principles expressed.
On January 27, 1785, "the representatives of the freemen of the
State of Georgia in General Assembly met, and by the authority of
the same" passed a n Act entitled "an Act for the More Full and
Complete Establishment of a Public Seat of Learning in This State."
The Act is a s follows:
"As i t is the distinguishing happiness of free government t h a t civil order
should be t h e result of choice a n d not necessity, a n d the common wishes of
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the people become the laws of the land, their public prosperity, and ever1 existence, very much depends upon suitably forming the minds and morals of
their citizens. When the minds of the people in general a r e viciously disposed and unprincipled, and their conduct disorderly, a free government will
be attended with greater confusions and evils more horrid than the wild uncultivated state of nature: I t can only be happy where the public principles
and opinions a r e properly directed, and their manners regulated. This is an
influence beyond the stretch of laws and punishments, and can be claimed
only by religion a n d education. I t should therefore be among the f k s t objects
of those who wish well to the national prosperity to encourage a n d support
the principles of religion and morality, a n d early to place the youth under the
forming hand of society, that by instruction they may be molded to the love
of virtue and good order. Sending them abroad to other countries for their
education will not answer these purposes, is too humiliating a n acknowledgement of t~heignorance and inferiority of our own, and will always be the
cause of so great foreign attachments, that upon principles of policy it is
inadmissible.
"This country in the times of our common danger and distress, found such
security in the principles and abilities which wise regulations had before established in the minds of our countrymen, that our present happiness, joined to
the pleasing prospec&, should conspire to make us feel ourselves under the
strongest obligation to form the youth, the rising hope of our land, to render
the like glorious a n d essential services to our country.
"AND WHEFLEL4S. for the great purpose of internal education, divers allotments of land have a t different times been made, particularly by the Legislature a t their session i n July, 1783, a n d February, 1784, all of which may be
comprehended a n d made the basis of one general a n d complete establishment:
THEREFORE ENACTED.
"Sec. 1. T h a t the general superintendence and regulation of the literature
of this State, a n d i n particular of the public seat of learning, shall be committed and entrusted to one board, denominated "The Board of Visitors," hereby
vested with all the powers of visitation, to see that the intent of this institution is carried into effect; and (13 persons named) who shall compose another
board, denominated "The Board of Trustees." These two boards united, or a
majority of each of them, shall compose t h e Senatus Academicus of the University of Georgia.
"Sec. 11. All statutes, laws and ordinances, for the government of the
University, shall be made and enacted by the two boards united, or a majority
of eaoh of them, subject always to be laid before the General Assembly as often
as required, a n d t o be repealed or disallowed as the General Assembly shall
think proper.
"Sec. 111. Property vested in t h e University shall never be sold without
the joint concurrence of the two boards, and by a n Act of the Legislature: but
t h e leasing. farming and managing of the property of the University for its
constant support, shall be t h e business of the board of trustees: F o r this
purpose they are hereby constituted a body corporate and politic, by the name
of "The Trustees of the University of Georgia:" by which they shall have per.
petual succession, and shall a n d may be a person in law, capable t o plead and
be impleaded, defend and be defended, answer and be answered unto, also, to
have, take, posses, acquire, purchase, o r otherwise receive lands, tenements.
hereditaments, goods, chattels or other estates, and the same to lease, use,
manage, or improve, for the good and benefit of said University; and all property given or granted t o or by the government of this State for t h e advancement of learning in general, is hereby vested in such trustees in trust a s herein described.
"Sec. IV. As the appointment of a person to be the president of and head
of the University is one of the first and most important concerns on which
its respect and usefulness greatly depend, the board of trustees shall first
examine and nominate; but the appointment of the president shall be by the
two boards jointly, who shall also hftve the power of removing him from office
for misdemeanor, unfaithfulness, or incapacity.
"Sec. V. There shall be a stated annual meeting of the Senatus Academicus
a t the University, or a t a n y other place and time t o be appointed by themselves, a t which the governor of the State, or, in his absence, t h e president
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of the Council, shall preside; their records to be kept by the secretary of t h e
University.
"Sec. VI. As the affairs and business of the University may make more
frequent meetings of the trustees necessary, the president and two of the
members a r e empowered to appoint a meeting of the board, notice always to
be given to the rest, or letters left a t the usual places of their abode, a t least
fourteen days before the said meeting; seven of the trustees thus convened
shall be a legal meeting. I n case of the death, absence, or incapacity of the
president, the senior trustee shall preside. The majority of the members present shall be considered a vote of the whole; and where the members age divided, t h e president shall have a casting vote: PROVIIYED ALWAYS, t h a t
nothing done a t these special meetings shall have any force o r efficacy after
the rising of the then next annual meeting of the trustees.
"Sec. VII. The trustees shall have the power of filling up all vm2XmcieS
of their own board, and appointing .professors, tutors, secretary, treasurer, stewards, or any other officers which they may think necessary, and the same
to discontinue or remove as they may think fit: but not without seven of their
number, at least, concurring in such act.
"Sec. VIII. The t,rustees shall prescribe t,he course of public studies, ap
point the salaries of the different officers, form and use a pujblic seal, adjust
and determine the expenses, and adopt such regulations, not otherwise provided
for, whioh the good of the University may render necessary.
"Sac. IX. All officers appointed to the instruction and government of the
University shall be of the Christian religion; and within three months after
they enter upon the execution of their trust, shall publicly take the oath of
allegiance and fidelity. and the oaths of office prescribed in the statutes of
the University; the president, before the governor or president of the council:
and all other officem !before the president of the University.
"Sec. X. The president, professors, tu,tors, students, and all officers and
servants of the University, whose office require their constant attendance,
shall be, and they are hereby excused from military duty, and from all other
such like duties and services; and all lands and other property of the University 's hereby exempted from taxation.
"Sec. XI. The trustees shall not exclude a n y person of a n y religious
denomination whatsoever from free and equal liberty and advantages of edu.
cation, or from any of the liberties, privileges and immunities of the University
in his education, on account of his, her or their speculative sentiments in
religion, or being of a different religious profession.
"Sec. XII. The ,president of the ,University, with the consent of the trus.tees, shall have power to give and confer all such honors, degrees, and licenses,
&is are usually conferred in colleges or universities, and shall always preside
a t the meeting of the trustees, and a t all the public exercises of the University.
''Sec. XIII. The Senatus Academicus a t their stated annual meetings shall
consult and advise, not only u,pon the affairs of the University, but also to
remedy the defects, and advance the interests of literature through the Gtate
in general. For this purpose it shall be the business of the members, previous
to their meeting, to obtain a n acquaintance with .the state and regulations of
the schools and places of education in their respective Counties, that they may
he :thus possessed of the whole, and have it lie before them for their mutual
assistance and deliberation. Upon this information they shall recommend
wh.at kind of schools and academies shall be instituted, agreeably to the constitution, in the several parts of the State, and prescribe what branches of
education shall be taught and inculcated in each. They shall also examine,
and recommend the instructors to be employed in them, or appoint persons
for that purpose. The president of the University as often as the duties of
his station will permit, and some of the members, a t least once a year, shall
visit them, and examine into their order and .performances.
"Sec. XIV. All public schooh, instituted or to ,be supported by funds or
public monies, in this State, shall be considered as parts or members of the
University, and shall be under the foregoing directions and regulations.
"Sec. XV. Whatsoever public measures a r e necessary to be adopted for
accom,plishfng these great and important designs, the trustees shall from
time to time represent and lay before the General Aseemhly."+Watkinsl
Digest, p. 299).
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As will be noted, this Act gave to the Senatus Academicus, composed of the Board of Visitors and the Board of Trustees, "The general superintendence and mgulation of the literature of this State,
and in particular of the public seat of learning." But alas, the
legislature omitted one of the most important features in the Act
establishing the University, in t h a t they made no real provision
which would enable the trustees selected by the legislature to bring
a n actual university from the airy heaven of the imagination and
place i t upon substantial foundation upon the earth in any definite
period of time. The 40,000 acres of land which had been set apart
for the purpose in 1784 was all of i t in unsettled territory. 5,000
acres of i t was in territory in dispute between South Carolina and
Georgia. If the immediate erection of buildings and employment
of teachers had been attempted and individual generosity had withheld its aid from the project, i t is not probable that the 40,000 acres
of land could have been sold a t once for a sum exceeding ten cents
per acre, or a sum total of $4,000.00. It must be remembered that,
while the 40,000 acres was to be land of the first quality, Georgia
was at this time granting millions of acres to settlers, especially
from Virginia and North Carolina, without any charges other than
the fees for surveying and recording the land grants, and in the
sales of the University lands this competition would have greatly
reduced their price. The truth of St. Paul's statement that "the
spirit indeed is willing but the flesh i s weak" is approved by the
failure of the charter of 1785 t o promptly provide the University
which its founders designed, For a long period of time, i t was impossible to assemble a quorum of the Board of Trustees, who then
comprised some of the most distinguished men in the State, nearly
all of whom were engaged in distinguished public service. The
charter of 1785 did not locate the University.
We find the next reference to the University a s such in the act
passed a t Augusta, on January 26, 1786, (Watkins' Digest, p. 320)
providing for the creation of the town of Louisville,'and for the location of the State capital a t Louisville. In this act i t is provided
that the commissioners "who shall lay off the town of Louisville, a t
a point within twenty miles of Galphin's old town" were directed to
lay off and mark out the land for the capitol building, penitentiary,
the courthouse, and gaol, and "the University." How much land
should be laid off to the University a t Louisville or in what portion
of the new town of Louisville i t should be located is a s indefinite
a s the location of the town itself. This, a s has been stated, was to
be within twenty miles of "Galphin's old town," b u t might be either
north, south, east or west; northeast, southwest, northwest, or
southeast, or any other direction from said old town. So f a r a s appears from the record, the injunctjon a s to the laying off of lands
or locating the University a t Louisville was not obeyed by the commissioners. As is well known, the capitol building and penitentiary,
were located in accordance with the act, but nothing was done a s to
the University further than the fact that the Senatus Academicus
finally held a meeting a t Louisville in 1799 which resulted in a tour
of inspection of the lands of the University, and finally resulted in
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planting t h e institution on a t r a c t of 633 acres near Cedar Shoals
in what had been formerly Franklin County, later Jackson, and a t
t h a t time in the newly created county of Clarke.
On February 3, 1786, the legislature by "An Act for dividing
t h e county of Washington," designated boundaries f o r a new county
to be called and known bx t h e name of "Greene County," and pro. a t a town
vided t h a t t h e "court house and gaol shall be built .
t o be laid out on the college survey on Richland Creek." It was
further provided "That the trustees of t h e University, or a majority
of them, shall be and they are hereby empowered and requested to
lay out o r cause t o be laid out, a town, which shall be known by t h e
name of Greenesborough, on said college survey; and after reserving
a number of lots sufficient f o r public buildings, t o sell and convey
the remaining lots and land adjacent .
. provided only t h a t
the money arising from t h e sale of said lots and lands adjacent,
shall be applied to the sole purpose of promoting learning and
science, and the quantity of land to be laid off does not exceed one
thousand acres." Watkins' Diqest, p. 322.
On February 13, 1786, the trustees of the University held a
meeting in Augusta looking t o taking active steps towards putting
the University in actual operation, and Abraham Baldwin was elected President of the College. However, t h e institution was not then
actually started and the legislature, by a n act approved December
5, 1800, being an act "to repeal a n ordinance passed a t Augusta t h e
26 day of January, 1786, so f a r a s represents t h e fixing of t h e seat
of the University" and t o repeal "an act f o r t h e more full and complete establishment of a public seat of learning i n this State ,so f a r
a s respects the appointment of trustees, and t o appoint a board of
trustees and t o define t h e board of visitors, and t o fix a permanent
seat f o r t h e said University," was passed. Marbury and Crawford's
Digest, p. 563. In this act i t was declared t h a t the University
should be located in one of seven named counties, to-wit: Jackson,
Franklin, Hancock, Greene, Oglethorpe, Wilkes, o r Warren. The
legislature also abolished t h e prior board of trustees and appointed
instead a new board composed of Abraham Baldwin, Hugh Lawson,
Benjamin Taliaferro, Joseph Clay, Jr., James Jackson, John Twiggs,
John Clarke (of Willtes), t h e Rev. Robert M. Cunningham, John
Milledge, Josiah Tatnall, Jr., Ferdinand O'Neal, John Stewart and
James M'Neil. I n this act t h e board of visitors was also reconstituted, so a s to be composed of the Governor, t h e Judges of t h e
superior courts, t h e President of the Senate, t h e Speaker of t h e
House of Representatives, and all t h e Senators except those from
the counties in which t h e Governor, Judges, President of t h e Senate
and Speaker of t h e House of Representatives a t the time resided,"
whose duty i t shall be t o superintend and regulate t h e literature in
this State, and in particular of t h e public seat of learning." The
fourth section of t h e act provided t h a t i t should be t h e duty of t h e
board of trustees t o call f o r and possess themselves of "any funds,
papers or books belonging t o t h e said university in any manner
whatever." The new board of trustees was vested with all the powers given by t h e charter granted in 1785. Upon t h e passage of this
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a c t the trustees held a meeting, and after many ballots decided upon
Jackson county a s the location for the University. John Milledge,
Abraham Baldwin, George Walton, John Twiggs and Hugh Lawson
were appointed a s a committee to select a site for the buildings.
The Augusta Chronicle of July 25, 1801, tells u s t h a t "the committee
repaired t o the county of Jackson and proceeded with attention and
deliberation t o examine a number of situations a s well upon the
tracts belonging t o the University a s upon others of private individuals. Having completed their views, they proceeded by ballot
t o make the choice, when the vote was unanimous in favor of a
place belonging to Mr. Daniel Easley a t the Cedar Shoals upon the
north fork of the Oconee river and the same was resolved t o be
selected and chosen for the seat of the University of Georgia. For
this purpose the tract, containing 633 acres, was purchased of Mr.
Easley by Mr. Milledge, one of the committee, and made a donation
of to t h e trustees; and i t was called Athens."
A s just stated, Abraham Baldwin, the reputed author of the
charter of 1785, had been elected president of the University a t a
salary of $1,200 per anpum. However, this was prior t o the act of
December 5, 1800, which abolished the prior board of trustees and
reconstituted a new board. Furthermore, Mr. Baldwin had been
elected a s United States Senator from Georgia and resigned the
presidency of the University and Josiah Meigs, also a native of
Connecticut, whom Mr. Baldwin had recommended for Professor of
Mathematics, was elected President, and upon him fell the task of
actually organizing and initiating the actual University of Georgia.
President Meigs was appointed on trial ("upon examination") and
requested t o teach until enough pupils should attend t o authorizr
t h e employment of a tutor. The lack of funds with which t o makt
the improvements directed by the trustees necessitated a loan oj
$5,000 by the legislature by the act approved December 27, 1802
Cobb's Digest, p. 1086. This sum was supplemented by a gift oj
$1,000 by Mr. James Gunn, of Louisville, and the trustees orderec
the erection of the brick building which still stands and is knowr
t o every alumnus as "Old College." The first commencement ol
the college occurred May 31, 1804, and the degree of Bachelor of
Arts was conferred upon a class of twelve, while four men, three
of them well known in the history of this State,.Elijah Clarke, William Prince, John Forsyth and Henry nfeigs received the Degree of
Master of Arts.
I n 1808 the Legislature declared that "whereas the board of
trustees of the University consists of thirteen members ,which is
deemed too unwieldly and expensive, vacancies which may occur
shall not be filled until the number i s reduced t o seven," (Clayton's
Digest, p. 456) and by the act of December 16, 1811, a new board of
trustees was appointed, consisting of Peter Early, Edward Paine,
Stephen Upson, John Griffin and William H. Crawford, thus reducing the number of trustees to five. By the a c t of 1811 i t was also
provided that "the Senatus Academicus shall meet a t Milledgeville
annually on t h e second Monday in November, before whom the
board of trustees shall lay all their proceedings relative t o the said

. . .

University
The examination of the students of t h e College
f o r degrees, shall be conducted by three of t h e trustees, with assist. . " Cobb's Digest, p.
ance of the president and professors
1087.
By a n act "to authorize the Trustees of the University of Georgia t o sell t h e lands belonging to said University, and t o systematize
the funds belonging thereto," approved December 16, 1815, (Cobb's
Digest, p. 1088) t h e trustees were authorized t o sell t h e several
tracts of land donated by the act of 1784 and i t was provided t h a t
if the lands should be disposed of upon a credit the bonds given f o r
t h e same should be secured by good personal security ,together with
a mortgage upon the land so purchased, and further authorized
the Governor to advance two-thirds of the face value of t h e bonds
and mortgages a s deposited in t h e State Treasury, which amount
was to be invested in bank stock. Under the provisions of this
act the Governor subscribed for 1,000 shares of stock f o r t h e University in the Bank of the State of Georgia. I t was provided t h a t the
trustees should never dispose of the stock without t h e consent of
the Legislature but should use only t h e dividends o r proceeds
therefrom. By this act ten additional members, consisting of David B. Mitcheli, Thomas U. P. Charlton, Nicholas Ware, Henry KolIock, Augustin S. Clayton, James Merriwether, James M. Wayne,
John Elliot, John A. Cuthbert, and George S. Troup were added to
the board of trustees.
President Meigs was first reduced to the Professorship of
Mathematics, and a little later was compelled to resign on account
of a too free expression of his political opinions, just a s he had
been relieved of his chair a t Yale. Contrary t o what we would a t
this time suppose, Meigs, though from Connecticut, was a n ardent
partizan of Thomas Jefferson, such followers then being called Republicans a s contradistinguished from Federalists. After his resignation he was unable t o leave Athens until Mr. Jefferson secured
f o r him the appointment a s Surveyor-General a t Cincinnati, and two
years thereafter he was made Commissioner of the General Land
Office. His daughter was the wife of John Forsyth, Governor and
Senator from Georgia, and Attorney General of the United States
under Andrew Jackson.
By the a c t approved December 21, 1821, i t was provided that
"the permanent endowment of the University shall consist of a sum
not less than eight thousand dollars per annum, and t h a t when i t
shall so happen that the dividends furnished by the bank stock
granted t o t h e University (by t h e act of December 16, 1815) shall
not be equal to t h e sum aforesaid, t h e Treasurer of this State i s required t o make up the deficiency semi-annually out of any monies
in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated." The Constitution of
1877 recognized this debt of $100,000, t h u s guaranteeing that the
$8,000 will ever be paid in t h e future a s i t has in the past. By this
act the Trustees "of Franklin College" were authorized t o collect
and retain the sum of ten thousand dollars arising from the sale of
fractional surveys previous to the year 1821. This legislative reference to "Franklin College," was a recognition of the resolution
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passed by the Board of Trustees in 1804 "that the present collegiate
buildings a t Athens be hereafter denominated and known a s Franklin College." By this act the Legislature also directed the Treasurer
of this State to pay to the Treasurer of the University the sum of
$15,000 out of the first money paid into the Treasury on account of
the purchases made a t the sale of the University lands, which sum,
together with the $10,000 arising from the sale of fractional surveys
were t o be applied, under the direction of the Trustees, to the building "of a new collegiate edifice a t Athens," since popularly known
a s "New College." An act "explanatory of the act passed December 21, 1821" was approved December 19, 1822, but makes no material alteration of the prior enactment.
A t i t s session in 1822 the Legislature passed two acts (Acts
1822, pp. 136, 137) concerning the collection of debts due the University arising from the sale of the University land, and granting
indulgence to the purchasers thereof. These acts are interesting
mainly because they evince the grave apprehension of the Legislature t h a t the purchasers of the lands would never pay for them and
thus leave the University without this means of support, and the
acts seek t o provide means by which any purchaser could complete
his payments.
By a n act approved February 9, 1854, the Legislature repealed
"so much of the charter of the University of Georgia a s requires an
oath or oaths to be taken by the officers thereof," and altered and
fixed "the time of the Meeting of the Senatus Academicus," setting
same for Thursday of the first week of each stated meeting of the
General Assembly. Acts 1854, p. 114 'and notes.
On December 11, 1858, a n act was approved which provided
t h a t the Governor of the State, or, in his absence, "the oldest member present" should be the President of the Board of Trustees of
Franklin College, and provided t h a t no member of the Faculty
should be a member of the Board of Trustees. Acts 1858, p. 107.
I n 1859, a t the regular meeting of the Board of Trustees of the
University, i t was determined t o reorganize the plan of the University, and in this reorganization the law school was established under
the supervision of Joseph H. Lumpkin, Thomas R. R. Cobb and William Hope Hull. By a n ~ c of t December 19, 1859, the Lumpltin
Law School was incorporated and these three gentlemen were both
the incorporators and the professors. On August 4, 1850, these
three named gentlemen had been elected professors and the law
school opened in the autumn of that year. From t h a t time until
t h e death of Judge Lumpkin (first Chief Justice of Georgia) in
1867, the law department of the University of Georgia was conducted
under t h e name of the Lumpkin Law School. Since 1867, the law
school has been conducted under the name of the Law Department
of the University of Georgia.
On December 14, 1859, (Acts 1859, p. 26) "An act to abolish
the Senatus Academicus, to give its powers t o the Board of Trustees
of the University of Georgia, and t o vest the government of said
University in said Board of Trustees," was approved. It is recited
in t h e preamble of this a c t t h a t "Experience has shown t h a t the
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body known a s the Senatus Academicus, on account of the hurried
manner in which its sessions are generally held, has a tendency t o
defeat, rather than promote the objects for which i t i s designed."
By this act the Board of Trustees was given power to elect its own
officers. The compiler of the Acts of 1859 recites t h a t "This ancient Aegis of our State University, held i t s last session, a t the
Capitol, in Milledgeville, on the 3rd, 4th and 5th of November, 1859,
having existed, under various modifications, upwards of seventy
years!'
"On February 26, 1877, "An Act t o repeal so much of section
1203 of the Code, (section IX of the charter) a s in violation of par.
6, art. 1 of the Constitution of the State of Georgia, a s prohibits a
portion of the people of Georgia from holding office on account of
religious opinions" was approved, and by its terms struck from said
section t h e words "all officers elected or appointed for the University of Georgia shall be of the Christian religion." Act 1877, p. 17.
The University of Georgia was the subject for much discussion
during the Constitutional Convention of 1877, with the final result
a s contained in art. 8, sec. 6, par. 1 of the Constitution of 1877 which
declares "The Trustees of the University of Georgia may accept bequests, donations, and grants of land or other property for the use
of said University. In addition to payment of the annual interest
on the debt due by the State to the University, the General Assembly
may, from time t o time, make such donations thereto a s the condition of the treasury will authorize. And the General Assembly
may also, from time to time, make such appropriations of money
as the condition of the Treasury will authorize, to any college our
university (not exceeding one in number) now established, or hereafter to be established, in this State f o r the education of persons
of color." This paragraph was amended by the act of 1920, p. 32,
making provisions for appropriations to high schools and the State
University. The provision for appropriation to a university f o r
colored people was repealed.
I n the third section of the Act of 1785 chartering the Trustees
of the University of Georgia, i t is provided t h a t "all property given
or granted to or by the government of this State for the advancement of learning in general, is hereby vested in such Trustees in
t r u s t a s herein described." And, in the fourteenth section of the
charter, the power was given to the Board of Trustees to establish
public schools or branch colleges a s parts or members of the University, which should be subject to all the provisions of the original
charter affecting the parent institution thereby established. Section 14 is a s follows:
"All public schools instituted or to be supported by funds or
public monies in this State shall be considered a s parts or members
of the University, and shall be under the foregoing directions and
regulations."
The general scheme of the charter was to give the corporate
body designated "by the name of the Trustees of the University of
Georgia," and expressly endowed with perpetual succession, the
supervision of the entire educational system of the State, which
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might be dependent f o r support upon any portion of t h e public funds.
P r i o r t o t h e Civil War, t h e University had constituted only one
college of the proposed University system. This was known a s
Franklin College, named in honor of the great statesman and philosopher, Benjamin Franklin. Had i t not been f o r t h e wisdom of t h e
Act of 1785 i n vipualizing t h e f u t u r e existence of a university somew h a t on t h e model of t h e English universities, which consisted of a n
aggregation of colleges, i t i s possible t h a t t h e State of Georgia
would have lost the Land-Script Fund accruing under the Act of Congress of 1862. The foresight of t h e Legislature of 1785 made possible f o r t h e Trustees of t h e University of Georgia to comply with
t h e Act of 1862 supra and t h u s save t h a t f u n d f o r t h e State of
Georgia, by reason of t h e f a c t t h a t t h e University of Georgia was
t h e only institution of learning in t h i s State a t t h e time of t h e passage of t h e Land-script Act which could comply with t h e conditions
imposed by Congress. In 1862, t h e Congress passed a n act giving to
t h e several States a n amount of public land to be apportioned each
State a quantity equal to thirty thousand acres f o r each Senator
and Representative to which each State was respectively entitled,
f o r t h e maintenance and support of a t least one college where t h e
leading object shall be, without excluding other scientific and classical studies, and including military tactics, t o teach such branches of
learning a s a r e related t o agriculture and mechanic arts, i n such
a manner a s t h e Legislature of t h e State may respectfully prescribe,
i n order t o promote liberal and practical education of t h e industrial
classes i n t h e several pursuits and professions in life. Of course,
i n 1862, our common country was dissevered and belligerent, and t h e
Southern States were not actually represented in t h e Congress of
t h e United States. However, i t may be said t h a t i t was greatly t o
o u r benefit a t t h i s juncture t h a t t h e Northern States did not recognize o u r secession, b u t considered u s still within t h e bounds of t h e
Union and entitled to representation i n Congress upon t h e scale of
representation fixed by the census of 1869. This Act required that;
each State should express i t s acceptance of t h e provisions of the
Act of 1862 by i t s Legislature within two years from t h e date of i t s
approval by t h e President. Owing no doubt t o t h e state of war,
Congress in 1866 extended t h e time by amending t h e original Act
so a s t o provide t h a t "the acceptance of t h e benefits of the said Act
may be expressed within three years from t h e passage of this Act,
and t h e colleges required by t h e said Act may be provided within
five years from t h e date of filing such acceptance with t h e Commissioner of t h e General Land Office." Act of July 12, 1866, ch. 109;
14 Stat. L., 208.
In March, 1866, (Acts 1865-66, p. 5 ) the General Assembly in
behalf of t h e State of Georgia accepted t h e provisions of t h e Act
of 1862, (12 Stat. L., 203) a s amended by the Act of Congress of
1866, (14 Stat. L., 208) and by a n Act approved December 12, 1866,
(Georgia Laws, 1866, p. 64) t h e Governor was directed t o apply f o r
and receive t h e script, sell i t to t h e best advantage and invest the
proceeds of t h e sale i n bonds of this State and disburse t h e interest
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of the investment for the support of the college contemplated by
the Act of Congress.
One of the conditions of section five of the Land-Script grant was
that "if any portion of the fund or any portion of the interest thereon shall by any action or contingency be diminished or lost, i t shall
be replaced by the State to which i t belongs, so that the capital of
the fund shall remain forever undiminished; and the annual interest shall be regularly applied without diminution to the purposes
mentioned in the fourth section of this Act, except t h a t a sum not
exceeding ten per centum upon the amount received by any State
under the provisions of this Act may be expended for the purchase
of lands for sites or experimental farms whenever authorized by
t h e respective legislatures of said States." Section four, to which
we have just referred, provides "that all monies derived from the
sale of lands aforesaid by the States to which the lands are apportioned, and from the sale of Land-Script hereinbefore provided for,
shall be invested in stocks of the United States or of the States, or
some other safe stocks, or the same may be invested by the States
having no State stocks in any other manner after the Legislatures
of such States shall have assented thereto and engaged that such
funds shall yield not less than five per centum upon the amount so
invested and that the principal thereof shall forever remain unimpaired." Under the provisions of the Land-Script grant as contained
in section three of the Act of 1862 (12 Stat. L., 504), "all the expenses of management and disbursement of the monies shall be paid
by the States to which they may belong out of the Treasuries of
said States, so that the entire proceeds of the sale of said lands
shall be applied without any diminution whatever to the purposes
hereinafter mentioned." A further condition of the grant is contained in the second subdivision of section five of the original Act
t h a t "no portion of said fund nor the interest thereon shall be applied directly or indirectly under any pretense whatever to the purchase, erection, preservation or repair of any building or buildings."
The provision which prevented the State of Georgia from sooner accepting the Land-Script grant is contained in section five of the Act,
(12 Stat. L., 504) that "no State while in a condition of rebellion or
insurrection against the government of the United States shall be
entitled to the benefit of this Act." This Act is generally known a s
the "Morrill Act." On March 30, 1872, Governor Smith, in conformity with the provisions of the Act of 1886 (Acts 1865-66, p. 5 ) , made
a contract with the Trustees of the University of Georgia authorizing them to found the State College of Agriculture and the Mechanic Arts. (Minutes of the Executive Department 1870-1874, p. 329.)
The executive order relating to this contract recites t h a t
"Whereas, the time allowed the State accepting said donation to establish a college or colleges under the provisions of said act of Conqress will expire on the 2nd day of July, 1872, when by the terms
)f said grant, if a college such a s is therein described shall not
lave been established, the grant shall cease, and this State will
)e bound to repay to the United States the proceeds of the donation
aforesaid," then recites that the Legislature by act of March 10,
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1866, had accepted t h e terms of t h e Act of Congress of 1862, a s
amended, and t h a t Hon. Benjamin Conley, exercising t h e executive
powers of t h e government, on J a n u a r y
, 1872, had sold t h e scrip
issued to one Gleason F. Lewis f o r $243,000, upon terms of $50,000
cash, and balance i n eighteen months from date of sale, and then
recites t h e a c t of December 12, 1866, and "whereas, t h e University
of Georgia i s t h e only institution of learning i n t h i s State having
power by law to organize and establish a college in all respects such
a s i s described in said act of Congress" and "the Board of Trustees
having established a college, distinct in its organization and specific
a s t o i t s object, i n conformity in every respect with t h e a c t of Congress above nemed, a s follows, t h a t is t o say," and t'nen follows the
order of the Board of Trustees organizing the new college. By this
order of Trustees the college was named "The Georgia State College of Agriculture and Rlechanics Arts." The Chancellor of the
University was charged with t h e government of t h e said college,
under regulation of the Board of Trustees of the University. The
officers of the new college were designated a s (1) a President
charged with t h e active supervision of t h e college, subject t o the
Chancellor, (2) a Professor of Agriculture and Horticulture, who, in
addition to t h e duties of his chair, was required to each year, i n different p a r t s of t h e State, deliver such "popular lectures on agricult u r e and horticulture" a s may be found practical, (3) Professor of
Analytic and Agriculture Chemistry, (4) Professor of Mineralogy
and Economic Geology, (5) Professor Industrial Mechanics and
Drawing, (6) Professor of Natural History and Philosophy, (7) Professor of Physical Geography and 3leteorology, (8) Professor of
English Language, (9) Professor of Military Tactics. This order
also created a n "engineer department" by transferring t h e Civil
Engineering School under Professor Charbonnier from t h e University t o t h e new college, and further, guarantees f r e e tuition to as
many students, residents of t h e State, a s there a r e members of the
General Assembly; and extends rules and regulations of the Board of
Trustees, applicable to the University, to the Agricultural College,
where not inconsistent with "this a c t of organization." The Chancellor of t h e University w a s ordered to open t h e college by May
l s t , 1872. This order, or resolution, was signed by C. J. Jenkins,
a s President, and Wm. L. Mitchell, a s Secretary, of the Board of
Trustees of the University. The executive order then proceeds:
"Ordered, that the $243,000 derived from the sale of the Land-Script,
a s aforesaid, shall be invested i n t h e bonds of t h e State of Georgia
bearing seven per cent. interest and t h a t t h e money so invested shall
constitute a perpetual fund, the capital of which shall remain forever undiminished and t h e interest of which shall be inviolably appropriated t o t h e endowment, support and maintenance of t h e college organized by the Board of Trustees of the University of Georgia
a s hereinbefore set forth."
It will be observed t h a t not one cent of t h e f u n d s appropriated
by t h e Morrill Act ( a s well a s subsequent donations by t h e Nationa l Government) can be expended f o r buildings.
The City of Athens, by t h e issue of $25,000.00 in bonds and by
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donating them to the Trustees of the University of Georgia, enabled
them to comply with the requirement of the Act, which forbade the
expenditure of any portion of the fund in the erection or repair of
buildings, and thereby secured the location of the second college of
the University system a t Athens.
By the Act of August 30, 1890, ch. 841, 26 Stat. L., 417,) Congress provided "that there shall be, and hereby is, annually appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated
arising from the sales of public lands to be paid a s hereinafter provided, to each State and Territory, for the more complete endowment and maintenance of colleges for the benefit of agricultural
and mechanic a r t s now established, or which may be hereafter established, in accordance with a n Act of Congress approved July 2,
1862, the sum of $15,000.00 for the year ending June 30, 1890, and
a n annual increase of the amount of such appropriation thereafter
for ten years by an additional sum of $1,000.00 over the preceding
year, and the annual amount to be paid thereafter t o each State and
Territory shall be $25,000.00, to be applied only to instruction in
agriculture, the mechanic arts, the English language and the various
branches of mathematical, physical, natural and economic sciences,
with special reference to their application to the industries of life
and to the facilities for such instruction." This Act f u r t h e r provided t h a t no monies should be paid out under this Act to any State
where a distinction of race or color i s made in the admission of
students, though the maintenance of separate colleges for white and
colored students should be held to be a compliance with the provisions of the Act, if the funds received in such State are equally
divided. (26 Stat. L., 417.) To this Act was added the proviso
t h a t i n any State where a college had been established under the
provisions of the "Morrill Act" and also in which a n educational
institution of like character has been or may be established for the
education of colored students in the educational and mechanic
a r t s and i s now aided by such State from its own revenue, t h e Legislature of such State may propose and report to the Secretary of the
Interior a just and equitable division of the fund to be received under the Act between one college for white students and one institution for colored students. The Act of Congress of 1890 provides f o r
t h e time and manner of the annual payments to the States and t h a t
if any portion of the monies for the support and maintenance of colleges or the institutions for colored students 'shall by any action
or contingency be diminished or lost or be misapplied, i t shall be
replaced by the State or Territory to which i t belongs, and, until,
so replaced, no subsequent appropriation shall be apportioned or
paid to such State or Territory, ancl no portion of said monies shall
be applied directly or indirectly under any pretense whatever t o
t h e purchase, erection, preservation or repair of any building or
buildings." The third section of this Act also requires a report by
the President of such colleges to be made to the Secretary of Agriculture a s well a s the -Secretary of the Interior annually. Upon
the Agricultural Appropriation Act of March 4, 1907, ch. 2907, was
engrafted what i s known a s the "Nelson Amendment," which pro-
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vides f o r t h e annual appropriation out of any money in the Trensury not otherwise appropriated t h e sum of $5,000.00 in addition to
t h e sums named in t h e original "Morrill Act" and the Act of 18!M
f o r t h e fiscal year ending J u n e 30, 1908, with an annual increasc ol'
t h e amount of such appropriation thereafter f o r four years by an ntl
ditional sum of $5,000.00 over t h e preceding year making i n all
$25,000.00 and t h e annual sum thereafter t o be paid $50,000.00.
I n 1914, by t h e Act of May 8, 1914, ch. 79, 38 Stat. L., 372, wIl:~l
i s known a s t h e "Agricultural Extension Work Act" was put i n
operation. By t h i s Act provision i s made f o r a permanent nl)propriation a t t h e expiration of nine years of t h e sum of Four nIillinn
One Hundred Thousand ($4,100,000.00) Dollars for each ycnr. "in
addition t o t h e sum of F o u r Hundred Eighty Thousand ($480,0013 00)
Dollars hereinbefore provided" t o aid in diffusing among the prnplr
of t h e United States useful and practical information on suhjrrts
relating t o agriculture and home e c o ~ m i c sand to encourage thr
application of t h e same. The work was to be inaugurated in connrrtion with the college or colleges in each State which were rcceivin~
t h e benefits of t h e "Morrill Act" and t h e Act of August 30, 18!)0.
(26 Stat. L., p. 417). T h e annual sum before referred to is allottrd
annually t o each State by t h e Secretary of Agriculture and paid i n
t h e proportion which t h e r u r a l population of each State bears to t h ~
total r u r a l population of all t h e States a s determined by the next
preceding census, and no payment out of t h e additional approprin
tions provided f o r years subsequent t o 1907 until an equal sum h:~s
been provided by t h e Legislature of such State, or by State, counf!..
college, local authority or individual contributions from within tlics
S t a t e f o r t h e maintenance of t h e co-operative agricultural extrnsion
work provided f o r in t h i s Act. (38 Stat. L., 373.)
The benefit of all of t h e foregoing Acts i s received by tl~c,
Georgia State College of Agriculture, which is, in reality, by ri~.tuv
of t h e Act of 1906, (Georgia Laws, 1906, p. 10) t h e successor of 11111
State College of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts to which prcvio~t.
reference has been made. Upon t h e acceptance of the original Innd
script provided by t h e "Morrill Act," t h e college a t Dahloncyn,
known a s t h e North Georgia Agricultural College, sought to l)r
made a department of the University and was accepted by the Trnstees October 24, 1872.
T h e Medical Department of t h e University of Georgia is lnrntrrl
a t Augusta. It started its career a s a n independent institution.
being chartered by t h e General Assembly in 1828 a s the Jtrtlic:~l
Academy of Georgia. Acts 1828, p. 111.
I n t h e foIIbwing year t h e name was changed to the IIedicnl Cnl
lege of Georgia. Acts 1829, p. 107; Acts 1833, p. 130. Under this
title i t operated until 1872. On August 1, 1873, negotiations ~i~hic-11
had f o r some time been pending looking to t h e inclusion of this 1m1lege into t h e State University system were concluded by the :~tlop
tion of a resolution t o t h a t effect by t h e Board of Trustees of tlir
University of Georgia. It t h u s became a n integral part of thr Tini
versity system, known a s t h e Medical Department of the Univrrsitv
of Georgia. There was no express legislative sanction of this union
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until the passage of the act approved August 1, 1911 (Acts 1922, p.
154). By this enactment provision was made f o r t h e control and
management of the Medical College of Georgia a s a branch of the
University. I t s powers were defined and i t s property was transferred to the University. The existing Eoard of Trustees of the Medical College was displaced by a Board of Directors composed of nine
members; six to be appointed by the Governor with the advice and
consent of the Senate, and three to be appointed from the Board of
Trustees of the University by the Chairman of said Board.
During its more than forty years of independent existence i t
had been more than once recognized by the State and assisted by
donations from the State Treasury, (see k t s 1860, p. 66) and had
given t o the State a very large number of able and distinguished
practioners of medicine. Since its incorporation into the body of
the University the General Assembly no doubt would have made
more liberal provisions for its maintenance were i t not for t h e f a c t
that this branch of the University has only a leasehold of its buildings and grounds.
I n 1882, the Hon. N. E. Harris, of Bibb County, introduced i n
t h e General Assembly of the State of Georgia a resolution providing
f o r the appointment of a committee of seven t o investigate the feasibility of establishing a school of technology and male training in
the mechanic arts, who were authorized to examine institutions of
the character mentioned in the Northern and Eastern States. I n
pursuance of this resolution, such committee was appointed and
upon their return reported in favor of the establishment of such a n
institution a s a branch of the University of Georgia. I n accordance with this recommendation, Mr. Harris introduced a Bill f o r t h e
establishment of a school of technology on t h e 25th day of July,
1883. Though the Bill was favorably reported by the Committee on
Finance, and every argument in favor of its passage was suggested
in the debate which followed upon t h e third reading of t h e Bill, t h e
measure failed of passage a t this session of the General Assembly.
In the session of 1884, the measure was a second time introduced by
Mr. Harris, and, in spite of much opposition, i t was finally passed
by the House on the 29th day of July, 1885, and, thereafter passing
the Senate, was approved by the Governor on October 13, 1885.
(Acts 1884-85, p. 69.) The government of this branch of t h e University was committed to a Board of Trustees consisting of five members, and the location of the school by these Trustees was t o be determined in favor of the community offering t h e greatest inducements in the way of contribution t o the establishment of the new
school of technology then denominated "The Technological School,
a branch of t h e State University." As a result of a competitive
contest in which the Trustees adjudged that the City of Atlanta
offered the largest inducements f o r the location of the school, this
branch of the University was located a t Atlanta and the construction began in the year 1886. Since that time, Acts have been passed
increasing the number of the Board of Trustees and changing the
name, and, in 1911, t h e name was changed to the Georgia School of
Technology. (Acts of 1911, p. 159.) Provision has also been
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made. a s found in Acts of 1912, p. 182, f o r t h e granting of honorary
degrees by t h e Trustees of t h e University of Georgia to those who
may be recommended by the Board of the Georgia School of Technology, and i n 1919 t h e Legislature passed a n Act authorizing the
Trustees of t h e School of Technology itself to confer degrees appropriate t o i t s course of studies.
On t h e 30th of August, 1887, your speaker introduced i n the
House of Representatives a Bill t o Establish a n industrial institute
and college f o r t h e education of t h e girls of Georgia and f o r other
purposes a s a branch of t h e State University. This Bill was favorably reported, read f o r the second time and three hundred copies
printed f o r t h e use of t h e House. It was t h e f i r s t effort to create
a woman's college directed and supported by t h e State a s a n essential unit of t h e University system a s contemplated by t h e Act of
1785. The demands upon t h e State Teeasury in t h e completion of
t h e State Capitol then i n course of construction and i n t h e appropriation f o r t h e erection of t h e School of Technology left t h e State
without sufficient f u n d s to initiate t h i s undertaking a t t h a t session
of t h e General Assembly. F o r t h a t reason, its author did not press
i t s passage, though t h e introduction of t h e Bill t o establish a college a s a p a r t of t h e University f o r t h e education of t h e girls of
Georgia attracted t h e attention and enlisted t h e hearty support of
every leading daily newspaper a t t h a t time published i n Georgia,
and was endorsed by t h e pens of John H. Estill, of t h e Savannah
Morning News; Henry W. Grady, of t h e Atlanta Constitution; Albert R. Lamar, of t h e Macon Telegraph; Patrick Walsh, of t h e Augusta Chronicle; and J o h n Temple Graves, of t h e Rome Tribune. At
t h e next succeeding session of t h e Legislature, Mr. Atkinson, of
Coweta, later a distinguished Governor of Georgia and who a s a
member of the House in 1887 was one of t h e supporters of the Bill
introduced by Mr. Russell, of Clarke, again presented t h e proposition
t o t h e General Assembly, and by his legislative skill and magnificent popularity succeeded-in placing upon t h e statute books t h e Bill
authorizing t h e creation of t h e Georgia Normal and Industrial College to be located a t Milledgeville, which t h u s became a unit in the
system of colleges embraced within t h e University of Georgia. In
1922 t h e name of the college was changed from t h e Georgia Normal
and Industrial College t o t h a t of t h e Georgia State College for
Women.
The Georgia State Industrial College f o r Colored Youths, a coeducational institution of learning f o r negroes, was instituted by
t h e Act of November 26, 1890, Acts 1890, p. 114. By t h i s a c t the act
of 1874 (Acts 1874, p. 32) making a n appropriation from t h e Land
Script Fund t o Atlanta University t o equitably distribute the benef i t s of this fund between the white and colored races was repealed.
It was located a t Savannah and is governed by a Board of Directors
subject t o t h e Board of Trustees of t h e University, and to i t the
Trustees of t h e University appropriate t h a t portion of t h e Land
Script Fund agreed to be equitable in t h e division of such fund
agreed t o by t h e Commissioner of Education under the contract
of 1890.
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I n 1891 a college f o r t h e education of male teachers w a s organized, t o be located upon t h e property of t h e University formerly
known a s Rock College (and which was a n academy f o r t h e instruction of youths preparatory to their entrance to Franklin College)
known a s t h e State Normal School. Acts 1890-91, (Vol. 1 ) p. 126.
I n 1893 t h e a c t establishing t h e School was amended t o provide f o r
the admission of females into the school a s well a s males. A c h
1893, p. 63.
I n 1906 (Acts 1906, p. 75) another branch of t h e University
was established a t Valdosta, known a s t h e Agricultural, Industrial
and Normal College i n South Georgia. This name was later, by
Act of the Legislature (Acts 1913, p. 155) changed t o T h e South
Georgia State Normal College, and i n 1922 t h e name of t h i s college
was changed to t h e Georgia State Woman's College a t Valdosta.
Acts 1922, p. 174.
The District Agricultural and Mechanical Schools were established by virtue of t h e Act of 1906 (Acts 1906, p. 72) "as branches
of t h e State College of Agriculture, a department of t h e University
of Georgia."
T h e Alexander H. Stephens Institute, a t Crawfordville, was established a s a branch of t h e University by t h e Act of 1916 (Acts
1916, p. 98).
I n 1917 a n a c t was passed which authorized t h e Governor t o
establish t h e Agricultural, Industrial and Normal School, f o r t h e
training of colored teachers, which i s located a t Albany. Acts
1917, p. 195.
In 1919, t h e Bowden State Normal and Industrial College was
established a s a branch of t h e University, with a provision t h a t i t s
Board of Directors obtain a t r a n s f e r of title t o t h e trustees of t h e
University of t h e property of t h e Bowden College, which was done,
and t h u s Bowden College, established a t Bowden in 1856, became
a unit i n t h e University system. Acts 1919, p. 262.
The South Georgia Agricultural and Mechanical College, a t
Tifton, and t h e Georgia Normal School, a t Statesboro, were each
established a s branches of t h e University i n 1924. Acts 1924, p.
177; Ibid, p. 165. The State A g ~ i c u l t u r a land Normal College, a t
Americus, was established in 1926, a s a branch of t h e University.
Acts Extraordinary Session, 1926, p. 34.
By section 1365 of the Code of 1910 the Chairman of the local
Board of Trustees of each branch of the State University a r e designated a s ex-officio members of the Board of Trustees of t h e University "where by laws now of force they a r e made such trustees."
Under this provision t h e President or Chairman of t h e Boards of
Trustees or Directors of t h e State College of Agriculture, t h e North
Georgia Agricultural College, The Medical College of t h e University, t h e Georgia State College f o r Women, t h e Georgia School of
Technology, t h e Georgia State Woman's College, t h e Georgia State
Industrial College f o r Colored Youths, t h e Bowden State Normal
College, t h e South Georgia Agricultural and Mechanical College,
and t h e State Normal School a r e ex-officio members of the Board of
Trustees of the University.
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I n 1906 the Legislature, in recognition of valuable assistance
rendered to the University, passed a n act providing for the appointment of a non-resident, native Georgian to membership upon the
Board of Trustees of the University, and Honorable George Foster
Peabody, of Saratoga Springs, New York, whose beneficience had
greatly aided the University, was appointed as such Trustee by the
Governor. The act provides that no appointment shall be made to
fill the office created in case i t becomes vacant. Acts 1906, p. 77.
I n addition to the above, the Board of Trustees of the University
i s composed of one member from each Congressional district, four
from the State a t large, (Code of 1910, para. 1365), three members
from the City of Athens (Acts 1923, p. 56), four members elected
from the Alumni Society (Acts 1925, p. 269), and the Governor, exofficio. (Code of 1910, para. 1367.)
In Sec. 1397 of the Code of 1910, the authorized branches or colleges of the University system are set forth, and, by the provisions
of See. 1398, all of the branch colleges for white students are made
coeducational, except the School of Technology, which i s confined
exclusively to male students; and the Georgia State College for
Women located a t Milledgeville, which, by the terms of the Act
creating it, reserves its benefits entirely for the girls of the State.
Under t h e terms of the original charter of 1785, and by action of the
Board of Trustees, female students a r e permitted to attend and to
obtain degrees i n old Franklin College, the original and initial member of the University system. A summary of the powers, duties and
regulations from time t o time enacted for the government of the
University may be found a s codified in Secs. 1363 to 1395, inclusive,
of the Code of 1910. However, the Legislature in enacting that
Code into laws recognized, a s it had previously done, t h a t quite a
number of laws relating to the powers and privileges of the Trustees
of the University in the administration of the great educational
institution entrusted to them, were not embraced within the Code,
and, therefore, i t i s provided in Sec. 1396 of the Code t h a t "the various Acts of the General Assembly relative to said University in
force a t the time of the adoption of this Code, if not embraced herei n and not inconsistent with what is so embraced, are still of force."
The rights of the University of Georgia, and what i s f a r more imp o r t a n t i t s duties to the State a s trustee when acting under the
direction of t h e General Assembly, are fully recognized and expressed i n every manner known to legal science: First, in our organic law, the Constitution of the State; second, in the Acts a s embraced in the Code, a s well a s i n any statutes relating to the University which have not been codified and a r e not repugnant. to the
Code; third, by decisions both of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court; and fourth, by numerous executive and administrative
orders issued by properly authorized agents of both the State and
National government.
There has been some confusion and contest a s to the origin of
the Act of 1785, and a s to the authorship of the prior Act of 1784
under which the g r a n t of forty thousand acres of land for a college
or seminary of learning was first made. Abraham Baldwin is gen-
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erally accredited with the honor of having first suggested in Georgia the idea of a State University of the nature of that set forth in
the charter of 1785. In "Georgia, The Thirteenth Colony," written
by Dr. Mildred Rutherford; a s well a s "Abraham Baldwin," a most
delightful book written by Dr. Harry C. White, the illustrious Nestor
of the faculty of the University, the claims of Abraham Baldwin to
the right to be called the father of the University are strongly asserted, and Pippincott, in his history of Georgia, has given Abraham
Baldwin credit for the Act of 1784, which really fore-shadowed the
Act of 1785 chartering the University. .However, in volume 2 of
Stevens' History of Georgia, page 344, the learned author attributes
the suggestion of the establishment of the University t o Governor
Lyman Hall's address to the Legislature on July 8, 1783. To whichever of these two great Georgians, Hall or Baldwin, the ideal thought
of establishing a University for the higher education of our youth
first came as an inspiration is immaterial. Their intimacy was
such t h a t no doubt the matter was privately discussed between them
before there was any public expression by either a s to a proposition
a t that time so seemingly nebulous. Both Hall and Baldwin were
from Connecticut; both alumni of Yale where they became personally well acquainted; both tutors in Yale and ordained ministers
of the Congregational Church in Connecticut, but both of whom, a s
very slyly suggested by Dr. White, found in reaching Georgia that
the supply of ministers in Georgia a t that time exceeded the demand; and so Hall became a physician and Baldwin a lawyer. I t
may be said to their credit, however, that a s the practice of law and
of medicine found field for labor just a s sacred to humanity a s the
ministry itself, that under a foreordained dispensation of the Almighty, they were not called to preach, but ordained, the one t o minister to the sick and the afflicted, and the other to guide his fellow
citizens in the path of truth and righteousness in their civil affairs
on this earth, the better to prepare them to reach and enjoy the
blessings of the Great Hereafter. Were we to determine the question of the priority of suggesting the State University for Georgia
a s between Abraham Baldwin and Lyman Hall by the evidence a s
to the first public expression in favor of this proposition, the evidence would require finding in favor of Georgia's signer of the Declaration of Independence, Dr. Lyman Hall.
In addressing the Legislature on the 8th day of July, 1783, and,
of course, before the passage of either the Act of 1784 or that of
1785, Lyman Hall, who was then Governor of Georgia, in the course
of his address, said: "In addition, therefore, to wholesome laws restraining vice, every encouragement ought to be given t o introduce
religion and learned clergies to perform Divine Worship in honor
t o God and to cultivate principles of religion and virtue among our
citizens. For this purpose, i t will be your wisdom to lay a n early
foundation for endowing seminaries of learning; nor can you, I conceive, lay in a better, than by a grant of a sufficient tract of land,
that may a s in other governments, hereafter, by lease or otherwise,
raise a sufficient revenue to support such valuable institutions."
From the foregoing brief of the legal history of the University
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of Georgia we discover certain salient facts which constitute landmarks of the law which tend to keep i t before our eyes and in our
remembrance. These land-marks should serve no less the purpose
of guiding those in official position aright in the future. As long
a s Georgia shall assist a s a sovereign State i t will be a s t r u e a s
when our forefathers of the General Assembly made their utterance
t h a t i t i s "the distinguishing happiness of free government t h a t
civil order should be the result of choice and not necessity, and the
common wishes of the people should become the laws of the land,
their public prosperity, and even existence, very much depends upon
suitably forming the minds and morals of their citizens. When
the minds of the people in general a r e viciously disposed and unprincipled, and their conduct disorderly, a free government will be
attended with greater confusions and evils more horrid'than the
wild uncultivated state of nature; i t can only be happy where the
public principles and opinions are properly directed, and their manners regulated. This is an influence beyond the stretch of laws
and punishments, and can be claimed only by religion and education. It should therefore be among the first objects of those who
wish well to the national prosperity to encourage and support the
principles of religion and morality, and early to place the youth
under the forming hand of society, t h a t by instruction they may
be moulded to the love of virtue and good order.
"This country, i n t h e times of our common danger and distress, found such security in the principles and abilities which wise
regulation had before established i n the minds of our countrymen,
t h a t our present happiness, joined to the pleasing prospects, should
conspire to make us feel ourselves under the strongest obligation
t o form the youth, the rising hope of our land, to render the like
glorious and essential services to our country."
I t is notable in t h e charter which follows that the benefits of
the proposed University are extended alike to all citizens of t h e
State, expressly disregarding any diversity of race or creed, religious or political opinion, or station in life. It i s a n equally outstanding fact t h a t this charter, after all has been said and done
to promote equality of the sexes before the law, contains perhaps the
first declaration in the laws of any nation, tribe or tongue of the
equality of women in the grant of educational privileges by the
State to its citizens. When the Legislature came to bestow the
blessings designed by the creation of its highest seat of learning it
declared in section eleven of the charter that "The trustees shall not
exclude any person of any religious denomination whatsoever from
f r e e and equal liberty and advantages of education, or from any of
the liberties, privileges and immunities of the University in his education, on account of his, her or their speculative sentiments in religion, or being of a different religious profession." All religious
denominations were placed upon an equal footing and in the same
class, sharing fully in all the blessings to be conferred, were those
who had only "speculative sentiments in religion," thus including
all who might not have made any decision, profession or affiliation
with any of the denominations previously alluded to.
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I n using the word "her" i n this section (eleven) the fathers perhaps foresaw the prophetic ken the equality of women in all respects
with men, which obtains today, but whether they did or not, they
were evidently determined t h a t the girls should receive equal privileges in education of a s high a grade a s that accorded to the boys
a.nd did not hesitate to write the sentiment into law. Whatever
may be said of the efforts of others thereafter to further the cause
of higher female education, the Legislature of 1785, in the provision
for the establishment of the University of Georgia, placed our commonwealth a s a sturdy pioneer of the outstanding movement which
has followed. I have alluded to these two incidents to show the
broad scope within which the act was designed to operate, a s embracing all the then citizens of the State (slaves never being citizens), but the outstanding fact of the State undertaking to educate
its youth for the benefit of the State itself was so novel and so outstanding a s to challenge profound consideration. I t is a fact that
this was the first instance in history where the State undertook
by the establishment of a State university to furnish the sinews of
war by which ignorance should be eradicated. It is true that previous provisions had been made for free schools to provide education of a n extremely restricted character, the three R's a s i t was
commonly said, based, I imagine, upon the supposition that those
who received only the benefit of these primary schools began each
of the three words, reading, writing, and arithmetic, with a capital
R. But the Legislature of 1785 in the passage of the charter of the
University of Georgiaushered in the dawn of a new day, recognized
the truth of Pope's statement that "a little learning is a dangerous
thing," and realized that really educated citizens are among the
greatest assets in the commonwealth of any country, deemed i t a
duty t o provide the means of a liberal education within the State so
a s to guarantee homogenuity in the ideals of our youth and patriotic
devotion to the State. This idea, which is strongly impreised by
a reading of the charter of the University, was but a natural outgrowth of a statute in existence which disqualified any citizen of
this State who went abroad for an education and remained for a s
much a s three years or more from holding any office of profit or
trust in this State after his return for a like period of time, during
which he was held to occupy the position of a n unnaturalized alien,
though he might have been born,-and his father before him,-upon
the soil of Georgia or any of the United States. (Cobb's Digest,
p. 364.)

A Case in the Court of Appeals
By R. C. BELL
(Address t o Bar Association, 1927.)
The subject about which or away from which I shall talk to you
on this occasion is, "A Case in-not
on-the
Court of Appeals."
While i t i s t r u e that, if we should include our entire official family,
there may be cases ON the court, a s well a s I N the court, my sclection of t h e particular subject resulted not from a disposition to
discuss the characteristics of my colleagues or of the other officials, but rather from t h e notion t h a t from the mass of litigated
cases and t h e court's experiences with them, I might be able to
glean something, of law or fact, of sense or nonsense, or a mixture
of all, with which t o interest you, a t least a s a diversion, while you
wait f o r the next item on the program. I shall make no more than
passing reference t o any particular case, but will relate certain incidents connected with different cases, and tell something of tlir
internal method of handling t h e court's business, with a few observations and comments thrown i n f o r good measure.
As t h e result of a constitutional amendment proposed and retified in 1906, t h e Court of Appeals came into existence on January
1, 1907. The number of judges was increased from three to six by
a n Act of the General Assembly passed in 1916. Since there is now
but little reason why anybody should be informed upon the subject, I believe those who do not personally recall the legislation are
generally of t h e impression t h a t t h e increase in the number of
judges was by virtue of t h e constitutional amendment adopted the
same year; but this latter amendment was mainly to change the
jurisdiction of that court and of t h e Supreme Court, by abolishing
t h e prior illogical arrangement of having jurisdiction in civil cases
depend upon the identity of t h e court in which the case originated,
and by establishing in lieu thereof t h e more natural system of determining jurisdiction by t h e character of the case. The first of
t h e amendments referred t o fixed t h e number of judges at three,
"until otherwise provided by law," and i t was under this provision
t h a t the Legislature increased t h e number to six. See, Fountain rs.
The State, 149 Ga. 519. The Act of 1916, held valid in the Fountain
case, not only increased t h e number of judges, but also provided:
"The court shall sit in divisions of three judges each, but two judgca
shall constitute a quorum of a division. The assignment of judge3
t o each division shall be made by the Chief Judge, and the personnel
of t h e divisions shall from time t o time be changed in accordnncc.
with rules prescribed by t h e court. The division of which the Chirf
Judge is a member shall be known a s the first division, ant1 he
shall be its presiding judge. H e shall designate the presiding judge
of the second division, and shall, under rules prescribed by t h e
court, distribute t h e cases between t h e divisions in such manner a 3
t o equalize t h e work a s f a r a s practicable; and all criminal case3
shall be assigned t o one division. Each division shall hear and determine, independently of t h e other, the cases assigned to it". Ga.
L., 1916, P. 56.
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Thus, i t i s seen t h a t f o r the purpose of hearing and deciding
cases, the General Assembly has all but nominally converted one
court into two, making two Courts of Appeal, instead of one Court
of Appeals. For the purpose of establishing and maintaining organization and rules, and of distributing the cases, the court i s
one; but for all other purposes, i t is two. Under the Act from which
I have just quoted, the division of the court into sections was mandatory, and i t would not now be possible f o r the judges merely of
their own volition to reunite themselves, for the decision of cases,
into one body. A tribunal of unusual character has resulted. While
t h e divisions of t h e court a r e and must be, for some purposes, separate and independent, for other purposes they compose a union
which in the words of Webster might be described a s "one and inseparable." I s i t not an interesting circumstance, that, whether purposely so designed, or whether created and developed only through
an overruling and all-wise necessity, the Court of Appeals, in i t s
dual form and character, appears to have been fashioned in the
similitude of the greatest of all governments? And may not this
sentiment, even if i t is sentiment only, add t o its honor a s a n institution and contribute to the inspiration of those who seek to serve
through i t s processes?
Questions for decision a r e occasionally discussed informally by
the judges of one division with the judges of the other division, but
a s a rule one division knows little or nothing of what the other i s
deciding until the decisions are published i n the advance sheets of
the Southeastern reporter. May I remark that, notwithstanding this
fact, conflicts between the decisions of the respective divisions are
exceedingly rare, and t h a t the scarcity of such conflicts would seem
t o be evidence that each division i s tracking the law pretty closely
in i t s rulings?
It sometimes happens that, because of the disqualification or
absence of one of the judges, a case will be decided by only two
judges, who, according to the Act of 1916, constitute a quorum. This
i s no innovation, however, for the same rule prevailed in the Supreme Court from its creation until 1896, when the number of justices was increased from three to six. I t was the uniform practice
of t h a t court "for about half a century to render decisions by two
concurring justices whenever the same was necessary." (Fountain
case.)
On the reorganization of the court under the Act of 1916, i t
was provided by rule or order that, f o r the purpose of distributing
the work, two criminal cases should be considered a s the equivalent
of one civil case, and in making up the calendars for the arguments
the cases are allotted to the two divisions on this basis until all
t h e criminal cases a r e exhausted, after which the remaining civil
cases a r e distributed equally to the two divisions. The clerk, under t h e direction of the Chief Judge, prepares the monthly calls in
acordance with this system. The judges do not, after the arguments,
take the cases to their offices and divide them a s they might divide
a bushel of potatoes. But within each division, the cases a r e assigned to t h e different judges by a system of rotation. In addition to
the court dockets, each judge has a n individual docket i n which he
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keeps a record of the cases assigned t o him. A judge i s not, under
t h e rules, qbliged t o keep a case merely because i t falls to him on
the argument; he may exchange i t to another judge on his division
if he can find one who i s willing. For the most part, however, the
cases are held and decided in accordance with the original assignments.
As i s well known, the judges know nothing of what i s contained
i n any of the cases until they a r e called for argument. It is then,
a s cases argued orally, that we receive the first impression. The
judges a r e agreed t h a t the best arguments are those which state
most clearly and concisely the nature of the case and the questions
presented for decision. This should be the f i r s t consideration. Other things may be added. The best brief is the one in which the attorney endeavors t o place himself in the situation of the court and
t h u s approaches and deals with the case a s though he had the responsibility of deciding it. It should be the desire and aim of the
attorneys t o assist the court in every way possible t o reach correct
conclusions, and i t may be further said t h a t in a court of review
the attorney who does not seek in good faith to accomplish that end
generally will render no considerable service t o his client. The
court delights to find a thorough and impartial brief, but will, of
course, look for the law wherever i t may be found and will continue
t h e pursuit until reason i s anchored upon the best foundation to be
discovered.
In the consideration of a case, I think the judges a s a rule first
read the briefs, beginning with t h a t of the plaintiff in error. Next
they read the record, after which they return to the briefs for the
purpose of studying t h e authorities cited. And further reference,
a s may be necessary, will be made both t o the record and the briefs.
Those attorneys who wonder whether the judges read their briefs
seemingly have no appreciation of the judicial attitude. The judge's
task i s a most onerous and responsible one, and he constantly feels
t h e need of light. Where can he more naturally expect t o find it
t h a n in t h e briefs of counsel?
Every record is not read by every judge. Otherwise, little time
would be left for anything else. Each judge i s trusted by the others
t o read the record and to state the facts of the case assigned to him.
If my associates cannot depend upon me for the facts of the ordinary case in my charge, I am unworthy of a position on the court.
If the judge whose lot i t i s t o prepare and submit to his colleagues
a n opinion i n a given case fails t o include a sufficient resume of
the facts, he will either state them orally or point out the material
parts of the record for the perusal of the other judges. There is
sometimes controversy between the attorneys a s to the proper construction of a pleading, of evidence, or other parts of the record;
in all cases of this character, where the matter in controversy is
not copied verbatim in the opinion submitted, and in other instances
where i t i s deemed necessary to a proper understanding of the case,
all t h e judges read the material parts of the record before participating i n a decision. The cooperation of counsel a s t o the manner
and contents of their briefs could reduce the work of the court very
materially on t h a t score.
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Each judge, in the preparation of a n opinion, makes a carbon
copy which he passes on with t h e record to his respective associates,
each of whom, after consideration, makes a note on the margin of
such copy, stating whether he concurs, dissents or wishes to consult, with perhaps comments o r suggestions. This copy is retained
in the private files of the judge writing the opinion. If a n opinion
has been returned to its author unconditionally okayed, the
case i s ready to be stricken from the docket a s disposed
of a t any time the judges may come together f o r t h a t
purpose.
This they a r e accustomed t o do either in t h e
court's library o r in the office of one of the judges.
There
is no form or ceremony in t h e rendition of a decision. When t h e
judges a r e through with a case, i t goes with the decision f i r s t to
Messrs. Graham and Stevens, the reporters, who carefully study the
decision f o r the purpose of correcting any errors the judge may have
made-in spelling, grammar or rhetoric, after which they forward
the decision and the record to the clerk. Whereupon, or presently,
th e clerk exposes the decision to public inspection on a table in his
office. Up to this time the case has only been in process. Now i t
is decided.
Where a case has been the rounds of the judges and the opinion i s not unanimously and unconditionally agreed to, i t i s brought
t o the consultation for discussion. The opinions are often times returned t o the author badly disfigured if not entirely ruined. Each
judge is constantly undergoing the severest discipline a t the hands
of his associates, for there i s no delicate sentiment which saves
one's work from the hardest blow which any member of t h e court
may see f i t to give it. Many cases are brought t o consultation repeatedly before they a r e passed. I have a n unhappy recollection of
one case (New Amsterdam Casualty Co. vs. Sumrell, 30 Ga. App.
682), a compensation case, in which I prepared the opinion, t h a t was
considered in a t least six monthly conferences before it was finally
agreed on. It was not decided until after the decision of some fifty
other cases on my individual docket which i t normally should have
preceded. The opinion was changed and re-written several times
in order to satisfy the views of the other judges.
I n another case, New Zealand Fire Ins. Co. vs. Brewer, 29 Ga.
App. 773, there was originally a n opinion. The decision in t h a t
case was also written by myself and the opinion was amended and
re-written eleven times, not merely for pastime, and not because I
was not satisfied. The trouble was, I could not satisfy the other
judges. The opinion a t the final conference was rejected entirely,
and the case was decided on the headnotes only. Great was the
loss to posterity! This is but one of the many instances of the
same nature in the experiences of each of the judges. I n close
cases the judges frequently write several opinions for the initial
consideration of their associates. This practice serves t o bring out
t h e different theories suggested and also to preserve the line of
thought which a judge may need but might otherwise forget before
succeeding in having the case disposed of. So f a r a s I have been
informed, the cases t h a t hold the record on the Court of Appeals for
the length of time actually consumed in their solution a r e t h e cases
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of Gilstrap vs. Leith, 24 Ga. App .720, and Central of Ga. Ry. Co.
vs. Hawley and Jones, 33 Ga. App. 375. Each of these cases occupied t h e time of t h e judge to whom i t was assigned for from six to
eight weeks before any satisfactory solution could be arrived at and
yet in each of them t h e opinion was brief and was embraced within
the syllabus, that in the first case, written by Judge Stephens, occupying only seven paragraphs and less t h a n two pages, and that in
t h e second case, written by Judge Jenkins, comprising but five paragraphs and less t h a n five pages. It i s not a rare occurrence to
encounter cases which require from one t o two weeks or even longcr
t o decide ,and i t i s impossible t o estimate t h e amount of work done
in a given case by the length and character of t h e decision rendered.
I t i s said t h a t t h e longest opinions a r e usually written by the nemeat judge, t h a t is, until he h a s better sense. Also some opinions arc
long from t h e same cause a s a certain famous letter, as explained
i n its concluding paragraph, i n t h i s or like language: "Please pardon t h e g r e a t length of this letter. I haven't time to write a shorter
one." I t is impossible t o conceive the amount of time and work that
i t may be necessary to devote to a given case without a comparison
with t h e thought and study which diligent and painstaking counsel
may have given to i t in its long or short history. An attorney may
have applied himself to studying and briefing of a case a t intervals through months, and maybe years, covering t h e various stages
from t h e time he was f i r s t consulted by his client until now when
i t has reached t h e court of review. The opposite attorney ha3
doubtless done t h e same. If you will but add together all the work
t h a t has been t h u s put upon t h e case by counsel, and contemplate
t h e aggregate, you will t h e better appreciate what the court must (lo
before reaching and stating a conclusion.
I have been told by my colleagues of experiences and I also
have had experiences which prove t h a t t h e subconscious mind plays
a n important p a r t in t h e decision of some cases. One of them rccently said t o me: "Several times a f t e r going t o bed with a case
upon my mind I have hit upon a n expression which I thought was
satisfactory and acceptable, and have gotten up and preserved it
by writing i t down upon a scrap of paper. Occasionally I 11nve
written such expressions in t h e dark. Perhaps t h a t is why somr
of my opinions a r e not clear."
I have heard i t said t h a t Judge Samuel Lumpkin, of the Suprcmp
Court, often referred t o his wife legal questions t h a t were puzzling
him. He i s quoted a s having said t h a t he found the feminine mind
frequently gave him a n insight into t h e case and assisted him in its
solution. We have now on t h e Court of Appeals one judge who
seems t o have a native inclination t o do the same thing, only he is
minus t h e wife. It i s said, however, t h a t he has the habit of seeking assistance and inspiration from many widows and old maids of
his acquaintance, and he acknowledges t h a t one of them gave him
t h e cue t h a t the use of articles of jewelry i s mainly ornamental, ns
expressed i n Bentley vs. Rice, 27 Ga. App. 816, a case which involved a breach of implied warranty in t h e sale of jewelry. What
i s law but common sense, anyway?
It not infrequently happens t h a t a f t e r a decision has been unanimously agreed to, t h e author will hold i t back and later seek to per.
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suade the other judges that his original opinion was wrong. This is
usually a f a r easier task h\an was t h a t of showing t h a t he was right
in the first place, although many of the reversals of the Court of
Appeals by the Supreme Court are in cases in which we became
doubtful of and withdrew from our first impression.
We have noticed that the Supreme Court often copies code sections without quoting them. We have had so much experience on
the Court of Appeals with judges dissenting from principles taken
verbatim from the code, that we have found i t a great time saver
always to use the quotation marks when embodying such provisions
in a decision.
The Constitution provides t h a t the Supreme Court shall have
jurisdiction of all cases that involve construction of that instrument.
The rule has been laid down, however, t h a t the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction t o decide questions of law that merely "involve application, in a general sense, of unquestioned and unambiguous provisions of the Constitution t o a given state of facts." Gulf Paving
Co. vs. City of Atlanta, 149 Ga. 114. I n Daniel v. City of Claxton,
35 Ga. App. 107, we had for decision the question of what is meant
by the phrase "registered voters" a s contained in the constitutional
amendment of 1918, prescribing the proportion of "registered voters" whose assent is requisite t o the issuance of bonds (Ga. L.,
1918, P. 99). Our first conclusion was t h a t the case should be transferred t o the Supreme Court a s one involving such a construction of
t h e Constitution a s to fall within the jurisdiction of that court. We
discovered, however, t h a t i t had been f i r s t carried to the Supreme
Court and by t h a t court transferred to the Court of Appeals, and
taking the judgment of transfer a s a n implied holding t h a t the case
involved only the application, in a general sense, of a n unquestioned
and unambiguous provision of the Constitution, we proceeded a s
faithfully a s we could t o discover the meaning of this provision,
which was so plain and perspicuous a s not to require interpretation. After much anxious study and investigation, and continued
doubt and uncertainty, we announced that, within the unquestioned
and unambiguous meaning of the Constitution, a registered voter
is one who has been lawfully registered and who has the present
right to vote. All of which was perfectly clear after i t once became
obvious.
A deduction, founded on actual sensations in t h a t case, though
hardly on law, is that in construing the Constitution, the Court of
Appeals may have no jurisdiction of a cause a t the outset, and yet
may acquire it by studying the case sufficiently t h a t the true meaning of the provision under consideration i s made manifest.
Nearly all cases appear easy after they are once decided, provided the decision i s correct or even plausible, and the weariness
incurred in solving a difficult case usually vanishes when the solution is attained. We are then seized with the spirit of song and
praise, and chant the comforting words, "The toils of the road
seem nothing when we get to the end of the way."
The case of Mitchell vs. Owen, 31 Ga. App. 649, is unique in
t h a t i t seems to be the only case in Georgia in which the judgment
stood REVERSED by operation of law. The Supreme Court on
certiorari reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals by a full
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bench, but on rehearing the Justices were evenly divided a s to whet h e r the original decision should be adhered to. Consequently, the
judgment remained reversed although three of the Justices thought
i t should be affirmed. Mitchell vs. Owen, 159 Ga. 704.
The most of us have been of the opinion t h a t bartering in human
beings was long since abolished; but Judge Bloodworth calls my
attention to a record i n which the following appears in the testimony
of one of the witnesses:
"I gave his $1,600 for the skidder and traded with him on this
Pofford place and taken a team of mules a t $1000 and a negro, and
after I got t h e negro he was not a a negro a s I though he was,
and I paid Mr. Tyson back the $1000, with the negro and a team of
mules." I refrain from commenting on this testimony.
Another case in which the facts were unusual was t h a t in which
the plaintiff's testimony showed t h a t his house burned DOWN while
everything in i t burned UP.
In a recent case, the opinion of the majority was written by
Judge Stephens, and a dissenting opinion was filed by Judge Jenkins. The judgment was in favor of the plaintiffs in error. The
attorney who represented them is authority f o r the statement that
one of the plaintiffs in error dropped dead while reading the opinion. Whether i t was the opinion of the majority or the dissent the
attorney was unable to say; and since both of these judges are given to writing strong opinions, and since both opinions were especially strong in that case, i t seems impossible to determine which of
the judges, if either, should be held responsible for this unfortunate
occurrence.
A little inquiry f o r the purpose of estimating the relative proportion of cases affirmed and reversed reveals the following: 1581
cases a r e reported in volumes 33, 34, and 35 of the reports, 1052
civil and 529 criminal. Of the 529 criminal cases, 441 were affirmed and 88 were reversed. Of the 1052 civil cases, 24 were dismissed; and 1028 were decided on their merits, with 661 affirmed
and 367 reversed. It is seen t h a t of the criminal cases only about
20% were reversed, of the civil about 33% ; and that the dismissals
amount t o less than 2Y2 %.
I t may be interesting, though doubtless not useful, to know
where the cases come from: Of the 1052 civil cases referred to,
Fulton county furnished about 2 0 % ; Bibb, Chatham, and Floyd,
varying but slightly in the order named, each about 4% ; Richmond,
Laurens, and Dekalb each about 2% ; Decatur, Colquit, Wilkes, illuscogee, Cobb, Glynn, and Berrien from 11/2%to a little less than 2 %
each. These fourteen counties furnished practically 50% of the
litigation in the Court of Appeals, a s reported in volumes 33, 34, and
35, while there were about 20 counties from which no civil case appears in these three volumes.
There are six counties from which we have had no civil case
in five years, with six other counties from which only one civil case
each has been sent up during this period. The fact t h a t a given
county supplies little or no litigation does not necessarily mean that
i t is a community of slight business activity or that i t furnishes no
work for the lawyer. We all know t h a t the lawyer serves his client
best by avoiding litigation and even controversy wherever i t i s pos-
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sible ta do so, without undue sacrifice of rights br principles.
Speaking of certiorari, a compilation shows that, beginning with
the effective date of the constitutional amendment providing for the
review of decisions of the Court of Appeals by certiorari, there are
reported in volumes 19 to 35, inclusive, an aggregate of about 9,000
cases, and that petitions for certiorari were made in 654 of this
number. The petitions were granted in 133 cases and denied in
521 cases. Of those cases in which the petitions were granted, 63
were reversed and 60 affirmed. The approximate results in per
cents were a s follows:
Certiorari applied for in 7% of the cases.
20% of the applications were granted.
80 % were denied.
50% of the grants were followed by reversals.
The reversals, however, amounted to less than 1 % of the total
number of cases decided.
However, the refusal of the Supreme Court to review a decision
of the Court of Appeals by certiorari is not to be taken as establishing that the decision is correct. From the rules on the subject,
a s laid down in Central of Ga. Ry. Co. vs. Yesbik, 146 Ga. 620, to the
effect that the "writ will be issued only in cases involving questions
of great public concern and in matters of gravity and importance",
and from a n analysis of numerous cases, it has been inferred by a
lawyer of great ability and discernment that error by the Court of
Appeals is not likely to be noticed on certiorari where it' is palpable,
in view of unequivocal ruling by th'e Supreme Court. Presumably, a decision containing such an error will not be followed and
will do no harm a s a precedent. The more glaring the error the
less likely is i t to unsettle the law, if it be true that the law is
settled upon the subject. Whether this theory be sound is not for
me, or even the Court of Appeals, to say. The suggestion of it
merely leads to the thought that a decision of the Court of Appeals
is not necessarily to be accepted a s settled law merely because a
petition for certiorari attacking it has been denied, and that its
appeal for a permanent place in the jurisprudence of the state must
depend upon its own intrinsic worth, measured alone by the high
standards of truth and reason. These considerations should, and I
believe do, make for a greater sense of responsibility in striving to
enunciate only correct and sound principles, and to declare as law
that which must prevail a s law even though the heavens fall.
The work of an appellate judge tends naturally to a spirit of
contrition and humility. Men working together unselfishly and
without rivalry in search of truth, all in pursuit of the same truth,
find little cause for self-exaltation. How greatly is this true where
the thoughts and opinions of each are so rigidly analyzed, and if
deemed to be wrong, are so rigidly condemned, as in the give and
take business of deciding intricate law cases and endeavoring to
write opinions therein in which all may concur. There is but little
stimulation from without, even after a decision is once agreed to
and delivered. The attorney for the losing party generally bemoans
the fact that the judges were so dense, obstinate, or careless as never
to see the point, while the attorney for the prevailing party knew
all the time what the decision would be if the court were only capa-
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ble of grasping his logic, and merely congratulates himself that
for once i t was. No other person is particularly interested for the
time being. But what higher inspiration can one enjoy than that
which is derived from the love of justice and truth or from the
consciousness of having done a n important task a s well a s one
could? We do hear from our work occasionally, a s in motions for
rehearing. I n these instances, there can be no mistake a s to the esteem in which our decisions are held in some .quarters. And it produces a delightful sensation, after the grant of such a motion, t o
have the counsel in whose favor the decision was originally rendered
come forward and defend i t a s one of the ablest ever written! However, the destruction of one's own handiwork, if i t is found t o be
faulty, is even more pleasurable, and no edifice is satisfying whose
architecture is not the law.
Of the rendition of decisions, a s of the making of books, there
is no end. Although i t is the belief of some great thinkers that if
men were wise enough to discern and apply them, i t would be found
that a very few rules would suffice for all cases, the multiplication
of laws has progressed t o the point of becoming a menace t o civilization, and the courts must share with the legislative bodies responsibility for the dreadful condition. If, i n the absence of a
Moses, a Justinian, or a Blackstone, there is no remedy f o r what
has been done, the greatest care should be taken not to add t o the
confusion. Judges should exercise the most extreme caution i n
declaring a new rule or in opening a n established rule to a new exception. In view of the many thousand principles which have already
become settled law, i t should be necessary t o announce new doctrines only in very rare and exceptional cases. The lawyer who is
constantly seeking to rairse some new question merely to glorify
himself serves the court and his country badly. So do appellate
courts mistake when they strain either t o affirm or reverse a given
case out of a desire for individual justice. Such a disposition can
only lead to artificial distinctions and exceptions, to the perplexity
of the people and the ultimate confounding of the courts themselves.
Under our system, the judge of a reviewing court should seek
t h a t justice which is found in the logical application of the law to
the facts of the particular case considered abstractly and hypothetically, and not t h a t concrete justice which the judge may personally
think ought t o be done under the peculiar circumstances. Every
case should be approached with a concern only for the discovery
and application of the law that most naturally governs it, and without regard to what may be the resulting judgment. I t is true, the
modern tendency seems to be in favor of dispensing concrete justice
in the particular case, and I do not say that in the course of time
i t may not prove to be the wiser policy. However, so long a s we require the writing and publication of decisions, and proceed under a
system of precedents, such tendency can only serve t o increase the
uncertainty of the law by making a rule for every case and thus enlarging the number of precedents. A disposition to deal freely with
the cases under the law may result in a larger number of reversals,
but i t will tend to prevent the inordinate multiplication of laws, and
make for a greater sum of justice in the end. Undoubtedly, i t will
a t times become necessary for the judges to supply a rule of law
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where none has existed before. There are gaps in the law which
can be filled in no other way. But judicial legislation can be justified only by a legal vacuum plus an absolute necessity t h a t i t be
filled, and the growth of the law by that process should be a s slow
and imperceptible a s the processes of change and growth and should
only follow in their wake. The courts should deal cautiously with
the so-called "case of first impression," and the attorneys should be
generous in their attitude even if the decision in such a case should
be sparing in its pronunciamentations. With no one to deliver us
from t h e multitude of rules into which we have become inmeshed,
i t behooves all who a r e interested in life under law t o lend aid
against thickening the maze.
In conclusion, I wish to say that I have prepared this paper for
t h e purpose mainly of filling up a period in the program which t h e
Committee informed me would otherwise be vacant. With the exception of the comments I have made upon the need of preventing,
a s f a r a s possible, increase in the number of laws, my "story" is
utterly without a moral-purely
a work of a r t (?) for art's sake.
Some of my statements will probably not meet with your full concurrence. However, I t r u s t no one will be disturbed by anything
I have said. I t should be remembered t h a t all I have said is mere
obiter dicta,-wholly
unnecessary, if not uncalled for, and
therefore i s not binding upon my associates, nor you, nor anyone,not even upon myaelf.
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Three Decades of the Law School's
Growth
W. G. CORNETT, '11, Professor of Law.
Address Made over W. S. B.
Ten minutes are insufficient for me to complete my subject on
the Law School's Growth and Function. I have, therefore, omitted
the portion having to do with the function of the School and shall
omit reference to its growth prior to the year of 1898.
The University was reorganized in 1859 and that year the Board
of Trustees determined to establish a law school "in which facilities
for the best legal education would be afforded." The Law School
was opened in the autumn of that year and it was incorporated by
a n Act of the Legislature on December 19, 1859. The first graduating class in 1860 contained 26 men. Excluding the years when the
exercises of the School were suspended during the War between
the States, from 1859 to Commencement in 1898,-thirty two years,
- 4 9 1 students attended the School.
1898

In 1898,39 students enrolled for the one year course required for
a degree. There were two professors and three lecturers. No member of the faculty devoted his full time to teaching. Only 15 subjects were taught in the School. It was housed in two rooms of the
,Ivy Building and the law library contained 100 volumes of the Georgia Reports, and standard text books, "the Secretary of the Interior
had recently supplied the Department with valuable publications
issued by the Government," and the Bancroft-Whitney Co. had recently presented a set of their "Practitioner's Series."
No previous course of study was required for admission to the
School but no student under the age of 18 was admitted.
1908
Entering into the decade beginning in 1908 we find that there
were 59 students registered (an increase in attendance of 51% over
1898), two professors, a s before, one of whom in 1900 had been elevated to the Deanship. There were three lecturers also and the
Dean devoted his full time to the Law School.
Two years were required to complete the course of 20 subjects.
The School had been moved to the second floor of the Academic
Building and had an office, two lecture rooms and a library room.
The library consisted of the Georgia Reports, standard text
books, and the "handsome law libraries" of two loyal sons of the
University, Brantley A. and Thomas N. Denmark, which had been
recently donated by Mrs. Brantley A. Denmark.
I n 1908 the entrance requirements were the same a s in 1898,
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except t h a t "Applicants for admission must pass a satisfactory examination upon the elements of a n English education."
In 1908 a lecturer on Procedure and Constitutional Law was
elected and in 1909, a professor having been elected Professor
Emeritus, a lecturer was promoted to a professorship. In 1913 a n
instructor in Law was elected,-the
faculty then consisting of b e
Dean, a professor and an instructor and three lecturers. During
this period the Dean and one professor devoted full time to the
School.
I n 1909 the requirement of fifteen academic units for entrance
went into operation.
1918
In 1918, the professor and instructor resigned and two new instructors were elected to the vacancies. As one of these instructors was called to the colors before the 1918-1919 session opened he
resigned and the faculty actually consisted of the Dean and one instructor until the spring of 1919 when another instructor was elected. Until 1925 the Dean was the only member of the faculty devoting his full time to the school.
I n 1918 the course was extended to three years; there were 22
law courses then offered. Seventy students were registered, which
was a n increased attendance of 18% over the year of 1908.
Excepting a larger library room and a n additional office the
School occupied the same quarters in the Academic Building a s were
occupied in 1908.
In the decade from 1908 to 1918 the library was greatly increased and i t was probably equal to any private law library in the State.
Books costing $1200.00 were purchased and there were donations of
other libraries by friends of the School.
The entrance requirements were the same a s in 1909.
1928
This year finds the Law School housed in its own building (tho
inadequate for present needs) ; a registration of 223 students (an
increase of 215% over 1918 and 466% over 1898); three full time
and two part time professors; a library of over 12,000 books; a
three years' course in the study of 42 subjects, and a n advance in
entrance requirements.
The course of study having been extended to three years i n
1918 larger quarters were imperative. For ten years prior to 1918
a member of the faculty had endeavored to secure a new building for
the Law School. Through fortunate circumstances the present
building was bought in 1919 on the credit of the then Chancellor,
two members of the faculty and a local alumnus of the School.
Alumni, friends of the School and the War Memorial Association
paid for the building and title was vested finally in the Board of
Trustees. The Trustees furnished sufficient money to equip a heating plant and recondition the building for law school purposes. In
1919 this building was bought for $15,525.00. I t is now conservatively estimated that i t can be sold for a t least $30,000.00. This
building is a net addition to the University's material and tangible
assets of a t least $25,000.00.
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I n June of 1921 the two instructors were promoted to professorships and another professor was also elected. In 1923 another instructor was elected and he was promoted to a professorship in
1925. A member of the faculty having died in 1925 his successor
was elected as a professor and a s President of the School. The
President, the Dean and one of the professors now devote full time
to the School,-thus making a faculty of three full time and two
part time teachers.
Apropos of the faculty i t should be mentioned that i t is carrying one of the highest teaching loads in the country. Bulletin
No. 21 of the Carnegie Foundation, which is just off the press, on
the "Present Day Law Schools in the United States and Canada"
shows that your law school faculty carries a teaching load of 11.8
year-hours, whereas the average teaching load is less than 8 yearhours in 34 schools; "in 18 schools the maximum load is not more
than 8 year-hours and the average is therefore often considerably
less; in 14 schools i t i s not more than 9 year-hours," which is the
teaching load carried by the Law School's part time professors. The
Bulletin shows, also, t h a t the Law School requires the greatest number of hours of class-room work of any of the 92 full time schools
listed. The Law School requires 57 year-hours of class-room work,
whereas, the average for the other 91 schools is only 38% year-hours
of class room work. (Id pp. 544-5 and Table 7 ) . In other words, a
graduate of your Law School must attend 1710 classes in the three
years a s against a n average of 1155 classes in the other 91 law
~ c h o o l slisted. These figures are based on a minimum of 30 weeks
to the scholastic year.
I n 1918 the library contained about 3,000 volumes of law books.
About that time the Trustees authorized the yearly expenditure of
$250.00 for library purposes, and in 1925 increased this sum to $1000
per annum. In 1925 the Legislature appropriated $6,000.00 to the
Law School Library. Thi.8 money was judiciously and carefully expended so today our library is probably second only to the State
Library in Atlanta.
Beginning with the autumn term of 1924 all candidates for the
law degree were required t o show that they had completed one year
of college work before they were admitted to the school. This is
the admission requirement now, except t h a t "mature students, 21
years of age, qualified to pursue the law course are admitted upon
authorization of the faculty, without one year's prerequisite of college work.
The entrance requirements will again be raised a t the term
beginning this autumn.
This narration of the facts making up the material and tangible growth of the School during the past three decades can not
convey a true picture of the Law School's growth. The spirit
back of the struggles of the members of the Board of Trustees and
the members of the faculties can not be reduced to mere words.
The aspirations and ideals of the School, illustrated in the positions
occupied by its graduates in the executive, legislative and judicial
departments of the State, the high standard of accomplishments by
its alumni a t the bar, and the leadership of its sons and daughters
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in the cause of good government ,are indelibly written into the life
of Georgia.

EPITOME
Faculty

1898
1908
1918
1928

2*
2*
3
5

No. subjects
taught
15
20
22
42

No. of
students
39
59
70
221

Increased
attendance
over pre
vious decade
51%
18%
215% (a)

3 lectusers, additional.
(a)This percentage of increase is due to a multiplicity of causes.

Years m
quired for
a degree
1898
1908
1918
1928

1

2
3
3

Entrance requirements.
(Educational)
None
15 units or equivalent.
same
1 Yr. College Work

Probable No.
of volumes
in Library.
200
1,000
3,000
12,000
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The Liability of a Mortgagee for the
Pavment of the Premium on a Fire
~nsurancePolicy After Default of the
Mortgagor under the Language Used
in the New York Standard Mortgage
Clause
The above question h a s recently caused much discussion and
has been t h e subject matter of a great deal of litigation due to the
rapid development and expansion of mortgage loan companies in
America and t h e demand f o r adequate protection against fire loss.
I t i s a practice of mortgage loan companies before closing a
loan t o require the owner o r mortgagor t o present a valid certificate of insurance showing protection against loss of the premises
by fire. The loan company then has the mortgagor direct the insure r t o attach t o the policy what i s commonly known a s the "NEW
YORK STANDARD MORTGAGE CLAUSE" or "LOSS PAYABLE
CLAUSE" which in effect protects t h e mortgage company in case
of a loss, as, out of t h e adjustment of the loss, the interest of the
mortgage company i s f i r s t satisfied.
The form of t h e New York Standard Mortgage Clause is as fc
lows :
''Loss or damage, if any, under this policy shall be payable to
as mortgagee (or trustee), as interest may appear, and this insurance as to tt11:
interest of the mortgagee (or trustee) only therein, shall not be invalidated by
a n y act or neglect of the mortgagor or owner of the within described property,
nor by any foreclasure or other proceedings or notice of sale relating to the
property, nor by any change in the title or o~vnershipof the property, nor by
the occupation of the premises for purposes more hazardous than are permitted
by this policy; PROVIDED, that in case the mortgagor or owner sliall neglect
to pay any premium due under this policy, the mortgagee (or trustee) s11;tU 011
demand pay the same."

A careful reading of this clause leads t o the conclusion that
new terms a r e written into the contract. To illustrate, it is provided t h a t the interest of t h e mortgagee (loan company) is protected
even tho t h e property i s willfully destroyed by t h e mortgagor (owner). Also the mortgagee is not affected by t h e change of ownership
nor by using the premises f o r purposes more hazardous than permitted originally. There a r e other minor terms which are added
t o t h e contract but which need not be referred t o a t this time.
The question then presented is what consideration does the ins u r e r receive f o r this additional risk. Apparently the answer is
none, unless there i s a loss; in spite of the language used in the
last sentence of the mortgage clause which sentence is underscored
above. It has been t h e opinion of insurance agencies that the mortgagee was liable upon default of the mortgagor and policies of insurance have been written assuming such liability when such policies would not have been written otherwise due to an unfavorable
credit report o r other cause.
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The question has never been passed upon by a n appellate court
in Georgia and i t is therefore necessary to look to the decisions of
other states for authority.
The leading case which seems to have first passed upon this
point favorable to the mortgagee is t h a t of COYKENDALL vs.
BLACKMER, 146 N. Y. S. 631.

It was held t h a t
"The clause, 'provided that in case the mortgagor or owner shall neglect
to pay a n y premium due under this policy, the mortgagee shall on demand pay
the same' being a part of the mortgage clause of the New York Standard policy,
and issued to a mortgagee upon the application and a t t h e request of the mortgagor, in accordance with a covenant of the mortgage, is a condition and not a
covenant, since the word provided means if or on condition and is used to express a condition."
The language of the Court is here quoted:
"The apparent meaning of the mortgage clause is that the insurance, as
t o the interest of the mortgagee, shall not be invalidated by any act or neglect
of the mortgagor, if the mortgagee shall on demand pay a n y unpaid premium,
a n d hence that if the mortgagee shall on demand neglect or refuse to pay the
unpaid premium, he shall no longer be entitled to avail himself of the stipu.
lation that no act or neglect upon the part of the mortgagor shall invalidate
the policy, but the insurance of the interest of the mortgagee shall thereafter
be governed by the policy itself, and this was doubtless the 'relation of the
mortgagee a n d the insurance compxnies following the demand of the company
for the payment of the premium in January, 1911, and the neglect of the mortgagee to pay the premiums.
"Had t h e intention been that t h e provision should be construed as a c o v e
nant rather than as a condition, a slight modification thereof or the addition
of the words 'which the mortgagee hereby covenants to do' would naturally
have been inserted and thereby all ambiguity removed."

A similar conclusion was reached in the case of HOME INSURANCE COMPANY VS. UNION TRUST COMPANY, 100 ATL. 1010
(R I). The Court held :
''A fire insurance policy's mortgage clause making the policy payable to
mortgagee, a s its interest may appear, provided, that, if the mortgagor fails
,to pay the premiums the mortgagee shall pay them. is not a n absolute agreement on the mortgagee's part to pay t h e premiums, but merely maltos such
payment a condition to its recovery on the policy."

Thus i t will be seen that the sole issue is whether or not the
language in the clause creates a condition or a covenant. If a condition there is no liability. If a covenant the result is reversed. The
two cases just cited clearly construe the language a s a condition.
In the HOME INSURANCE COMPANY case above referred to,
the Court in discussing its reasons for holding that the mortgagee
was not liable for any premium pointed out t h a t the standard form
was carefully worded by skilled and experienced lawyers who were
familiar with the meaning of the word "provided" and that they
could have, if they intended a liability on the part of the mortgagee,
insert the phrase, "and i t is agreed." They call attention to the
case of HASTINGS VS. WESTCHESTER FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, 73 N. Y. 141, decided in 1878 before the New York Standard
clause was adopted and which clause a t that time contained the
words "it is also provided and agreed."
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Another reasoning used by the Court in reaching such a decision was t h a t if the premium was not paid the policy could be cancelled on the prescribed notice. They further pointed out that the
mortgagee had no means of knowing whether the premium had been
paid or not and t h a t i t would impose a n unreasonable burden on
t h e mortgagee t o require i t to keep constant watch on the condition
of the account between the insurance company and the mortgagor in
order to protect itself from liability for unpaid premiums.
The court seems to lay the blame for the possibility of ambiguity upon the skilled insurance lawyers who no doubt drew the Act,
a s was approved by the New York legislature and adopted and in
use in other states.
The case of ORMSBY vs. PHOENIX INSURANCE COMPANY'
58 N. W. 301 (S. D.) referred to in the case just outlined did not
hold t h a t the mortgagee was not liable f o r premiums under a policy containing the New York Standard Mortgage clause. That question was not the issue. I t did hold, i n deciding another point that
t h e phrase used in the standard policy created a condition not a
covenant.
A similar conclusion was reached in JOHNSON SAMSON &
COMPANY, VS. FORT WORTH STATE BANK, 244 S. W. 657
(TEX)

.

The most recent case i s t h a t of WHITEHEAD VS. WILSON
KNITTING MILLS, 139 S. E. 456 (N. C.) which relieved the mortgagee from such liability. The Court in this case adopted the reasoning
in the COYKENDALL case and added a most significant reason which
seems to have been overlooked in t h e former cases, that is, that to
hold that the clause was a covenant rather than a condition would
be t o render the mortgagee liable for such premiums even after its
interest in t h e mortgaged premises had been satisfied, either by foreclosure or payment of the mortgage. In such a n event there would
be placed upon mortgage companies a burden which a s to i t s b u s i ness was unnecessary.
The WHITEHEAD case contains a well written opfnion and contains a n unusually clear 'review of the decisions herein referred to.
F o r a f a i r consideration of this question attention should be
called to two very early and important cases which held the mortgagee liable, namely ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE
CO., VS. UPTON, 50 N. W. 702 (N. D.) and BOSTON SAFE DEP.
& TRUST COMPANY VS. THOMAS, 53 PAC 472 (KAN.). In these
cases t h e clause was construed t o be a covenant, but from a careful
reference to t h e clause itself i t will be found to be different from
t h present New York Standard clause. This distinction is pointed
out in the UNION TRUST COMPANY case which refers to the old
New York Standard clause a s having inserted therein the phrase
"It i s also provided and agreed" which of course would lead to a
different conclusion. The present New York Standard clause has
no such phrase included therein.
The COYKENDALL, HOME INSURANCE COMPANY, PHOE-

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
NIX INSURANCE COMPANY, JOHNSON-SAMSON & COMPANY
and WHITEHEAD cases all construed the New York Standard clause
now in effect.
I t appears from the cases discussed that the weight of authority relieves the mortgagee from liability and these cases will no
doubt be considered sufficient for the determination of future cases.
I t will therefore follow that the only protection to be afforded the
insurer would be to effect some change in legislation reforming t h e
mortgage clause.
-WELBORN

B. CODY, Atlanta, Ga.
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As T o Automobiles
By Geo. F. Gober
The nation is now racked with questions of politics, theology,
education, f a r m relief and many other things that absorb public attention. Baseball has for some time had the ear of the public press
and has aroused much interest in the sport. It is not meant here to
make any reflection upon any of these things since newspapers, as
a rule, print what their readers wish and will pay for. No one of
these things involve necessarily life and death or hurts and injuries;
no one leaves in its wake death and destruction nor does any one of
them maim people and make widows and orphans; no one of them
destroys property.
Looking matters in the face, the greatest question before the
American people today is the prevention or the lessening of the
casualties that are caused by the operation of motor vehicles. In
the year 1927, 26,000 people were killed in the United States by automobiles and 700,000 injured with six hundred million damages.
Mr. Herbert Hoover stated t h a t in 1925 there were 25,000 killed and
600,000 injured. It i s hard to comprehend this great toll and it
would seem t h a t i t ought t o arouse the public conscience to a prevention or a t least the lessening of this great loss of life and property. I n the World War the United States called t o the colors four
million men and of these i t sent two millions across the waters to
fight in Europe. The war lasted 18 months and during that time,
in round numbers, 37,000 men were killed in battle and 15,000 men
died of wounds. Of course this was a great sacrifice made by our
soldiers. The Civil War lasted from 1861-65. The Federal Army
lost 74,000 men killed in battle and approximately 43,000 died of
wounds. There were called to the Federal colors 2,700,000 men.
There i s no reliable data t o show what the Confederates lost. I
give these figures a s to the casualties t h a t a r e happening now in
t h e nation by the operation of motor vehicles a s compared to the
losses sustained during t h e wars. Anyone can make his own comparisons.
I take from t h e Atlanta Journal, May 14th, 1928, the following
headings and memoranda; all of which happened on the 14th of
May:
"Two automobiles raced a Pennsylvania train and eight are dead
and one dying. At Chadburn, N. C., 6 persons a r e dead, 4 seriously
injured and more than 10 others escaped with minor injuries at a
railroad crossing accident. These people were riding in a truck.
A t Bryson City, N. C., 2 were killed as an auto dived into a creek.
A t Ft. Valley, Ga., 2 were killed a s a n automobile overturned rounding a curve. At Savannah, Ga., 6 persons were injured when their
car was forced off t h e highway by another machine. At Aberdeen,
Md., 2 soldiers were killed when their automobile crashed into a
train. At McCroy, Ark., 20 persons were injured-5
seriouslywhen a truck collided with a n automobile. On May 28th between
Cornelia and Gainesville, Ga., in a collision with another automobile a young girl was killed and 2 others seriously injured. In At-
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lanta on May 27, one person was killed and another was blinded
from injuries received when their can r a n into a bridge, this being
the third serious accident t h a t has occurred a t the same place withi n a month. One was knocked down and rendered unconscious on
t h e Rosedale road and his skull fractured on May 27th. Another
person was injured by a n automobile when it r a n into the bicycle
he was riding-and he is being treated a t the Henry Grady Hospital
f o r minor injuries. There was a head-on collision Sunday afternoon
near Druid Hills Golf Club injuring 4 and they were treated a t the
Henry Grady Hosptial. I n 1927, 154 were killed in Georgia by automobiles and 1100 were killed in New York City and 707 in Chicago.
It would be easy t o extend this detail, but i t is not necessary. Everyone knows from the newspapers what happens every day. The time
has come when public opinion must be directed to this matter. The
laws must be enforced. Every driver of a n automobile ought to understand t h a t the only safety is t o comply with the law. If t h e law
was complied with we would get rid of nine-tenths of the trouble.
Some when they set themselves a t the wheel of a car are obsessed
with t h e idea of the power of the machine t h a t i s in their control
and the first proposition to occur t o them i s t o find out how f a s t it
will travel and the faster the better i t suits them. Automobilists
and pedestrians have the same rights upon the highway. Every
citizen has an equal right to travel in any way he may see proper
and every other person, whether he drives a n automobile or drives
any other conveyance, has a right to insist t h a t everyone upon the
road shall exercise due care not only to protect himself but to protect everyone else t h a t i s traveling. These casualties can not be
charged to the automobiles-the automobile a t rest is not a dangerous machine; i t must have great power t o accomplish what i t does,
but i t i s dangerous only from the company i t keeps; t h a t is, the
chauffeur. The automobile has come t o stay. It is not worth while
t o cry out against it. I t is not the automobile, but those t h a t control i t t h a t cause the injury and damage. If every automobilist
would act upon the Golden Rule, "Do unto others a s you would have
others do unto you," the trouble would be a t a n end. It is a fact,
however, t h a t the great part of the trouble comes from reckless and
illegal driving and practices of the "road hog." This creature
should be driven off the road. He is not entitled'to any sympathy
when he comes before the courts. A friend told me of a n instance
t h a t happened up in Pennsylvania. A banker was brought before
t h e court for speeding. The Judge was a good friend of his. The
banker plead guilty and with a smile on his face stood up ready t o
pay his fine as he had done previously. The Judge said t o him:
"John, this i s the third time you have been up for speeding; you
seem t o have no regard for the law; I am going to break you. I
am not going to allow you to pay a fine." He gave John a term upon
t h e rock pile and John was thoroughly broken from speeding. If
this kind of medicine were administered in Georgia to some people
who seem to think they are above the law they would respect i t
afterwards.
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Is the Surety Discharged By Extension
of Time Granted to the Principal?
It was formerly a well settled rule in this state that an agreement between the creditor and t h e principal to extend the time of
payment f o r a definite period and for a valuable consideration, released the surety.l Since the adoption of t h e Negotiable Instruments
Law, however, there has been some doubt expressed a s to whether
this rule would still hold good.2 Under this same act in other states
i t has been held that the surety was a party primarily liable" under
1 Code of Geolrgia, Sec. 3543
Knight vs. Hawkins, 93 Ga. 709
Luden vs. Enterprise Lumber Co. 146 Ga. 284
Lewis vs. Citizens & Southern Bank, 31 Ga. App. 597
2 Arnold on Suretyship Page 143
8 Robinson Ruffin Co. vs. Spain (N. C.) 91 S. E. 361
I n Re. Nashville Laundry Co. e t al, 240 Fed. 795
First State Bank of Hilger vs. Long (Mont.) 174 Pac. 597

NOTES
Section 192 and that none of the defenses in Section 120 were therefore available to him.4
When the N. I. L. was adopted August 18, 1924, i t contained
only a general repealing clause applying to those Code Sections repugnant to o r inconsistent with the act and not specifying sections
by name. Repeals by implication are not favored in G e ~ r g i a . ~An
implied appeal arises only from an enactment, the terms and necessary operation of which cannot be harmonized with the terms and
necessary effect of an earlier act.6 A statute, general in its terms
and without negative words will not be construed to repeal, by implication, the particular provisions of a former statute which are
special i n their application to a particular case or class of cases,
unless the repugnancy be so glaring and irreconcilable a s to clearly
indicate the legislative intent to repeal.7
In view of the reluctance of the Courts to repeal Code Sections
by implication and of the length of time during which the rule i n
question has been established, we believe t h a t the surety's right to
a release from his liability still exists. Two recent cases, though
not directly in point, show a leaning in the direction we have indicated. I n the f i r s t case the Court of Appeals said:
"While under the Civil Code (1910) Sections 3543 and 3544 a surety will be
discharged by a novation changing the nature or terms of ,his contract, without his consent, and therefore the acceptance by the payee hank, without the
agreement or consent of the surety, of a nem note, in renewal or payment of
t h e original note signed by t h e surety will discharge him from liability. . ."s

.

Granting a definite extension of time on a valuable consideration i s a s much a novation a s giving a new note, therefore the surety
i s discharged even under the N. I. L. The second case involved a
note for which two parcels of land were given a s security. The
creditor released one of the parcels in consideration of a payment
of part of the debt. This increased the surety's risk and he was
discharged in spite of the N. I. L . V r o m all this i t should be clear
t h a t the Georgia Courts will not so interpret the Negotiable Instruments Law a s to remove from the surety the protection which he
has long enjoyed under our system of law.
4

5

6

7
8
9

Vanderford vs. Farmers Bank. 105 Md. 164. 66 Atl. 17
Cellars vs. Meachan 49 Ore. 196. 89 Pac. 426
Night & Day ,Bank vs. Rosenbaum, 191 Mo. App. 559 177 S. W.693
Okla. State Bank of Sayer vs. Seaton (Okla) 170 Pac. 477
Murray vs. State 112 Ga. 7
Moore vs. State 150 Ga. 679
Walker vs. City oP Rome. 16 Ga. App. 817
Griggs vs. City of m c o n 154 Ga. 519
Davis vs. Dougherty Co. 116 Ga. 491
Payne vs. Fourth National Bank of Macon
(Ga.App.) 142 S. E. 310
Loftis vs. Clay, 164 Ga. 84'5
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Competency of Husband and Wife to
' ~ e s t i f Against
i
Each Other
In Criminal Cases.
Under the rule in this state the wife can testify against the
husband only when he is charged with the commission of a criminal
offense upon her person o r a n attempt to commit such an offense
and in cases of abandonment of his chi1d.l
Formerly the husband could never under any circumstances,
testify against the wife.2
The new Act substitutes the word "either" f o r the word "the
wife" in paragraph 4 Section 1037 so t h a t i t now reads "Except that
either, shall be competent, but not compellable, t o testify against
the other upon the trial f o r any criminal offense committed, or attempted to have been committed upon the person of either by the
~ther."~
No case has been reported dealing with the Section in its changed form, but before this change a wife was allowed to testify where
t h e husband was tried f o r wife beating;4 and for pointing a pistol
a t her.6
Since this change in the law, no doubt the husband would be a
competent witness in a similar case. We a r e glad to see that the
State of Georgia now affords to the long suffering husband the protection he h a s long needed.
We believe this will prove to be a great stride towards the still
distant goal of equal rights for men.
o f Georgia, Sec. 1037, Paragraph 4
Ector v s . State, 10 Ga. App. 777, 778
74 S. E . 295
3 Acts 1927, Page 145
4 Stevens v s . State, 76 G a . 96.
6 Walls vs. State, 24 Ga. App. 697
102 S. E. 43
1 Code

2
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Recent Decisions
Possession under Bond F o r Title, trespassers making improvements, injunction,
jurisdiction.
Chase v. Endsley e t al. Dec. 14, 1927. 140 S. 93. 876.
~Mrs.Cora Frances Chase brought her petition against George M. Endsley
a n d Mrs. Inez Endsley, residents of Fulton County, and alleged in su~bstance.
that petitioner, on June 30, 1925, purchased 51 acres of land from Mrs. Maggie
L. Heery, received a bond for title, a n d therefore went into possession and
"has been in possession continuously from that date until the present date";
that subsequently the defendants entered upon the property "as trespassers,
and began the erection of a house on said property, and a r e still undertaking
to carry on the work of erecting the house"; that petitioner made her protest
against the alleged trespass, but defendants continued to erect the house: that
bhe defendants claimed that they had bought the property from Mrs. Heery,
a n d held a deed t o it; and this claim is untrue, a s they had no valid deed to the
property. Insolvency of the defendant is alleged, a s well a s irreparable damage. The prayers were that the defendants be enjoined from further trespassing upon the property, from entering upon it, and from continuing the erection of the house. A temporary restraining order was granted. To this petition the defendants filed their plea to the jurisdiction, contending that the
land in question is situated in the county of DeKalb and that the superior
court of DeKalb county has jurisdiction over suit r e s p s t i n g title to land in
that county, and not the superior court of Fulton county.
Defendants filed also general and special demurrers, one ground of which
was t h a t the petition does not show in what manner the plaintiff went into
possession. Defendants filed also their answer positively verifying, from which
it appears that they purchased the property in question and received bond for
title on June 29, 1925, from Mrs. Heel-y; and they received a warranty deed
from Mrs. Heery on August 11, 1925, and began the erection of improvements
in good faith on or about April 7, 1926; t h a t a t no time did plaintiff nutlie any
complaints that defendants were trespassing, o r that the property was hers,
until defendants were in possession and erected a garage, etc.
On interlocutory hearing, it appeared that the plaintiff's bond for title
was filed for record on July 13, 1925, and that the defendants' bond for title
was filed for record on July 3, 1925. The restraining order was dissolved. The
plaintiff filed a n amendment alleging that since the filing of her petition she
had found that the defendants hold a deed from Mrs. Maggie L. Heery, a resident of Gilmer county, conveying t h e land in question which deed is a cloud on
her title a n d is unoperative a s against (her, because a t the time i t m executed
and delivered the defendants knew that plaintiff had purchased the property
a n d was in possession. She prayed that Mrs. Heery be made a party defendant.
a n d that the d& Prom her t o defendants be cancelled. Mrs. Heery appeared
and filed, beside general and special demurrers, a n answer alleging t h a t her
!bond for title a n d deed were made in good faith, and were valid and effective,
and that she did execute a ,bond for title to patitioner, but that the inclusion of
the lots of land in controversy was by mistake. Defendants also demurred upon
the grounds that the facts set forth in the plaintiff's amendment were not sufficient t o authorize cancellation of t h e deed. The plaintiff again amended by
alleging the giving of notes for the pu'rchase money of the property, and the
)bringing suit by tihe holder of the notes in t h e city court of Decatur; and she
prayed that this suit be enjoined until her equitable suit be determined in the
superior court of Fulton county. She offered to do equity. The court sustained
the general demurrer, refused a n injunction a n d dismissed the action.
B. L. Milling and Chambers & Dickey, all of Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.
W.W. Qaines, Augustine S a m , and C .H. Feagan, all of Atlanta, for def e n d a n b in error.
BECK, P. J. (after stating t h e facts a s above). (1, 2) This case was dismissed upon demurrers filed by Mr. a n d Mrs. E n d l e y and by Mrs. Heery. I f
the suit a s originally brought is a case "respecting title to lands", i t should
have been brought and tried in the county of DeKalb, where the land lies, But
we think that i t is essentially a n action to enjoin a continuing trespass. Of
course, the title to the land is incidentally involved, a s has been ruled in sev-
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era1 cases decided )by this coucrt, but the fact that the title is thus incidentally
involved does not render it a case "respecting titles to lands." In Huxford v.
Southern Pine Co., 124 Ga., 181, 188, 52, S. E. 439, 442, it was said:
'Tf the purpose of the suit were to recover possession of the lands, of course
the superior court of Coffee county (where the land was not located) would
have no jurisdiction. Such was not the object to be attained by the judgment
prayed. I t was simply to restrain the defendant from doing acts prejudicial
t o the rights of the plaintiffs, one of whom claimed to be the owner of the
land. The title to t h e property was incidentally and collaterally involved, but
it was not such a suit ,respecting title to lands a s under the Constitution is
required t o be brought in the county where the land lies. I t w~asincumbent
upon the plaintiff to show t h a t they had such a n interest in the property a s the
court of equity would protect, and they showed this interest by shoming a complete chain of title."
And i n Powell v. Cheshire, 70 Ga. 357, 48, Am. Rep. 572, it was 'held:
"A bill in equity t o enjoin a trespass upon realty by felling timber is not
such a suit respecting t h e title to land as must be brought in the county where
the land lies. The proper venue of such a case is the county of the residence
of the defendant against whom substantial relief is prayed."
W e think, therefore, that inasmuch a s t h e petition shows a continuing
trespass, and that the petitioner had such a n interest in the property (under
t h e allegations which a r e to be taken a s true upon demurrer) a s a court of
equity would protect, a n d a right to a conveyance of the property in accordance with the terms of the bond for title, the court should have retained tho
case f o r hearing upon the issues made by the petition and the answers. \Ire
think, also, that t h e courts properly made Mrs. Heery, vendor of the land, a
party to the proceeding. When the question a s to whether the two lots of
land in question were included In the land sold t o Mrs. Chase, or were included
by mistake as contended by Mrs. Heery, is determined, then the question as
to how much of the purchase money Mrs. Chase must pay can be determind,
a n d i t can be determined i n this suit. As the matters stood a t the time Mrs.
Heery filed her suit in the city court of Decatur to recover judgment upon the
purchase money note, Mrs. Chase, according to her allegations, would be placed
in a position where she could inadequately urge a defense to these notes, for
t h e question as to whether or not the two lots in controversy had been sold
t o her by Mrs. Heery will be undetermined. All these questions can be determined i n t h e one equitable suit. And the court having erred in dismissing the
case upon general demurrer, the further proceedings were nugatory. Of course,
t h i s court is not passing upon the merits of the special demurrer. The lower
court disposed of the entire case upon the general demurrers. Upon a re-hearIng t h e special demurrers c a n be there disposed of.
Judgment reversed.
All justices concur.
Oonstitutional Law.-Legislature
has power to extend territorial jurisdiction of
Municipal Courts beyond limits of municipality.
Collier vs. Duffell e t al, Supreme Court of Georgia, 141 S. E. 194.
A defendant who lived in Fulton county outside of the corporate limits of
Atlanta, was sued in the municipal court of Atlanta. The suit was not defended
a n d a judgment was entered against him. Garnishment proceedings were instituted to enforce the judgment a n d the defendant brought a petition in equity
t o enjoin t h e proceedings. H e contended that the act of the General Assembly
extending the territorial jurisdiction of the municipal court beyond the clty
limits (Ga. Laws 1926, page 370) was unconstitutional because the amendment
t o the Constitution providing for t h e creation of this court in lieu of justice
courts in the city of Atlanta (Ga. Laws 1912, page 30), and authorized additional
jurisdiction for the new court "as t o amount o r subject-matter."
Mr. Justice Gilbert, speaking for a unanimous court, held the act constitutional. After quuting t h e section of t h e Constitution (Civil Code sec. 6460)
which confers upon the General Assembly the power t o make all laws (not In
conflict with constitutional provisions) necessary and proper for the welfare of
t h e State, and after referring to t h e provisions of t h e Constitution authorizing
t h e legislature to confer upon municipal courts "additional juriscliction either
as to amount or subject-matter," he said t h e latter cannot !by implication or
inference deny the General Assembly the power also of conferring a d d ~ t i o n ~ ~ l
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territorial jurisdiction (not inconsistent with t h e Constitution of Georgia and
not repugnant to the Federal Constitution). Said amendment of 1912 does not
in a n y manner restrict the General Assembly in the matter of territorial jurisdiction."
H e went on to say that the Constitution of this state, with reference t o
civil cases, provides that they shall be tried in the county wherein the defenda n t ~eSide.3(Article 6, section lti, par. 6). And in Starnes vs. Mutual Loan &
C. Co., 102 Ga. 597, he pointed out, it was held that there was no provision of
t h e Constitution which prohibited the General Assembly from enlarging the
territorial jurisdiction of justices of the peace.
The justice courts in the city of Atlanta were abolished by a c t of the legislature a n d the municipal cou'rt established in lieu thereof. Thence, "there being nothing in the constitutional amendment of 1912 confining the territorial
jurisdiction to t h e corporate limits of the cty, the act of 1925 is not unconstitutional f o r any reason assigned by petitioner."

Statute of Frsucls, Instrumonts under Seal, Agent's autho~ity,estoppel.
Baxley Hardware Co. e t a1 v. Morris. Dec. 15, 1927. 140 S. E. 869.
Suit by N r s . F. A. Morris against the Baxley Hardware Co. and others.
Judgment for the plaintiff, a n d defendants bring error. Reversed.
Mrs. F. A. Morris filed a petition for cancellation and injunction, alleging
that the Baxley Hardware Co. occupied premises owned by her, which she described; t h a t such occupancy was under a lease which, so f a r as she was concerned, was verbal only and was for five years only, but that she had learned
shortly before bringing suit that said company held a lease for seven years
purporting to have been executed by her; that she had never executed any
written instrument leasing said property, and had never authorized any person
t o do so in her behalf; "however, that s h e had considered her agreement to
rent said building to said Baxley Hardware Company for a period of five years
6~ a binding obligation upon her, a n d that in pursuance of said agreement she
had permitted said Baxley Hardware Company to continue to occupy said
building, although she had never executed to i t any lease or contract of rental
of a n y kind whatsoever."
Gilbert, J. "Any contract for the sale of lands, or any interest in or concerning them," to be binding upon t h e promisor, must be in writing signed by
the party to be charged therewith, or some person by him lawfully authorized.
Civil Code 1910, sec. 3222. (4). The contract sought to be cancelled in tihis proceeding, purporting to be a lease of real estate for a period of seven years, falls
under the section cited.
T h e foregoing section does not apply "where there has been performance
on the one side, accepted by the other in accordance with t h e con.trad," and,
"where there has been such part performance of the contract as would render
It a fraud of the party refusing to comply, if the court did not compel a performance." Civil Code 1910 sec. 3223 (2, 3).
A deed to lands is not required to be under seal in this State. A. K- and
N. R. Co. v. iWcKinney, 124 Ga. 929 (5), 53 S. E. 701, 6 L. R. A. (N 8)
436, 110 Am. ST. Rep. 215; Patterson v .Burns, 150 Ga. 198, 103 S . E. 241. A
lease contract of land for years is likewise not required to be executed under
seal United Leather Co. v. Proudfit. 151 Ga. 403. 107 S. E. 327.
The contract sought to be cancelled in this case concluded as follows: This
contract entered into in duplicate this the 21st day of Sept. 1921, Mrs. F. A.
-Morris (L. S.) Baxley Hardware Co., by D. M. Minchew (L. S.). Signed, sealed
and delivered in presence of J. C. Rogers.
Nowhere in the body of the instrument a r e to be found any words indicating that i t was the intention of the signers thereof that the instrument should
be under seal. I t is well settled that the intention to execute a sealed instrument must be indicated in the body of the instrument as well as after the signatures. Echols v. Phillips, 1 1 2 Ga. 700, 37 S. E. 977. The phrase "Signed,
sealed a n d delivered in the presence of," preceding the names of the witnesses.
does not indicate any intention of the parties. I t is merely a statement of the
witness.
No instrument shall be considered under seal unless so recited in the body
of the instrument. Civil Code 1910 sec. 4359. This section has been applied t o
contracts for the purchase of land, whish would include contracts for the pur-
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chase of a n interest in land, such as the purported lease here sought to be
cancelled. Elrod v. Bagley, 150 Ga. 329. 103 S. E. 841.
The purported lease not being a sealed instrument, the authority of W. W.
Morris to sign t h e name of his wife thereto w a s not required to be under seal;
but, being required to ,be i n writing, where the agent signs for the principal,
the agent's authority must be in writing.
Parol evidence was admissible tending t o prove t h a t Mrs. Morris knew
of contract and of t h e monthly payments of rents, and t h a t t h e defendant expended from $1,500 to $2,000 in making improvements on the property a s contemplated under the rental contract. The coul-t erred in rejecting such evidence.
Under the pleadings and the evidence, including that referred t o in the
preceding headnote, and testimony by plaintiff t h a t she had made her husband
her general agent, the jury would have been authorized t o find that, although
the contract was required to be in writing and the written contract was not
binding because plaintiff's name was signed ,by her agent without written
authority, yet, o n account of t h e improvements made by the defendant as contemplated in the rental agreement and its possession of about four years
and payment of the rent accepted by the plaintiff, the pl:~intif€w'zs estopped
from denying the validity of the contra.ct. Civil Code 1910, 3223(2,6); Petty v.
Kenyon 49 Ga. 468.
The demurrer to the petition was properly overruled. The court erred in
directing a verdict for the plaintiff and in overuling a motion for a new trial.
Judgment reversed.
All the justices concur except Justice Atkinson.
Fraud in Procurement of deed, proper parties.
White v. Lamar. Dee. 14, 1927. 140 S. E . 875.
RUSSELL, C. J.: Robert White brought a n action against Edna Mae Fambro
praying for t h e cancelhtion of a deed which had been executed and delivered
to her, and which it was alleged, had been obtained by fraud. I n this action
he joined W. T. Lamar as a codefendant. Upon demurrer the trial court struck
the name of Lamar as a codefendant, and exception is talcen to this judgment.
W e a r e of the opinion t h a t t h e judgment of the trial court was right and
i n accordance with law. No title had been conveyed to Lamar, and therefore
as t o him there was no deed. The petition contained a player that pending
t h e flnal disposition of the suit the defendants be restrained and enjoined from
signing a n y papers conveying, incumbering, o r attempting to convey on incumber the property described in the petition, and from attempting to change
in a n y manner the status; but Lamar having no title, t h e injunction as to him
was unnecessary and would be futile, because the pendency of the suit against
Edna Mae Fambro, to whom the petitioner had executed the deed, would affol'd
a sufficient warning to any would-be purchasers against accepting a deed from
Lamar, since he could only derive title through the minor 'Edna (~MaeFambro,
,whose only muniment of title is attacked in the petition on the ground that it
was obtained by fraud. Upon the filing of the demurrer based upon the ground
t h a t no cause of action was set out against W. T. Lamar, and upon the special
ground that there was a misjoinder of parties defendant in that t h e suit was
brought for the cancellation of the deed to which the defendant was not a party,
and upon the ground that no rellef was prayed against t h e defendant, who had
no interest i n the property sued for, the plaintiff amended his petition by alleging a conspiracy between the two defendants, and t h a t the misrepresentations stated in the original petition were made a s a result of this conspiracy
and with the intent to defraud t h e petitioner of his property; that both of the
defendants were present when the misrepresentations were made, and each of
the defendants acquiesced in all of the misrepresentatlons that were made; and
t h a t by reason of these representations (mis) the plaintiff had been put t o the
expense of employing a n attorney, $50.00 of which had been paid, which expense was due to the defendant acting in bad faith. After t h e filing of the
amendment the defendant renewed his original demurrer and demurred also
to the amendment. The demurrers were sustained.
The amendment offered could not cure t h e defect in the original petition.
I n the original petition t h e misrepresentation alleges to have been t h e fraud
by which the petitioner was induced to execute the deed to Edna Mae Fambro
was as follows: Ro'bert White had married the mother of Edna Mae Fambro.

RECENT DECISIONS
By this marriage he had become the father of a son. His wife had left his
home because she thought he ought to make a deed conveying a half-interest
in his home to her and his son, and that she would return to him if such a
deed were executed and delivered to her. The petitioner agreed to execute and
deliver such conveyance, and instructed Edna W e Fambro and W. T. Lamar
t o have such a deed drawn and he would sign it. They reported t o him t h a t
they had complied with his request, and pretended to read him a paper drawn
just as he desired it, conveying a n undivided half-interest in his home to his
wife and eon; and thereupon h e signed the paper which t h e dpfendants had pretended t o read him, he being unable to read or write. The paper was properly
attested. Later he discovered that the paper he had signed, instead of being
a deed to his wife and son conveying a n undivided half-interest i n his house
and lot, was a deed conveying the entire property to Edna Mae Fambro, his
stepdaughter.
The foregoing allegations may afford sufficient basis for the cancellation
of the deed to Edna Mae Fambro; but, as already stated, W. T. Lamar could
not be a party to a ,proceeding for cancellation, because no deed had been executed to him, and a n allegation that there was a conspFracy t o procure the
execution of the deed, even if there were a n allegation of sufficient facts to
show conspiracy, would not serve to make h a r a proper party in the proceeding for cancellation of the deed in question, or afford a basis in thls action
for t h e award of attorney's fees against him. While attorney's fees a r e allowed under the provisions of the Civil Code 1910, 4392, they cannot be recovered
of any except a proper party in the cause.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur.

blaster and Servant. Workmen's Compensation A d .
Where a construction company, having a c o n t m t t o build a public road or
highway obtained Prom another t h e use of his truck and the services of one
whom h e employed to drive it, a n d put them at work hauling materials for
the construction of tho highway, and where the driver, while s o engaged, was
subject to the direction and control of the construction company and was liable
to be discharged by the company from the particular work for disobedience to
orders or for misconduct, he was, while in the course of such employment, a n
employee of the construction company, within the meaning of t h e Workmen's
Compensation Act (Laws 1920, p. 167). United states Fidelity and Guaranty
Co. e t a1 v_s. Stapleton et al. Jan. 17. 1928. Court of Appeals of Ga.
The decedent was killed in the course of employment and because thereof,
by the overturning of a motor truck which he was driving. T h e contentions
of the plaintiff in error a r e t h a t the decedent w%s not a n employee of the construotion company, but was the servant of another a s independent contractor,
and also that the award was illegal because this company was not paying to the
decedent wages and was not liable for the payment of same t o him.
The questions for decision therefore are: (1) W a s the decedent a n employee
of the construction company within t h e meaning of the Compensation Act?
(2) Is the payment, o r liability for the payment, of wages to the alleged employee, by the person w u g h t to be held, a n absolute prerequisite to a n award
of compensation against him?
The court said t h a t under legal principles, i t is well settled that the fact
t h a t a n employee is the general servant of one employer does not prevent him
from becoming t h e particular servant of another under special circumstances.
a n d it Is true, a s a general proposition, t h a t when one person lends o r hires his
servant to another for a particular employment, the servant, as to anything
done in such employment, must be dealt with a s t h e servant of the person to
whom he is lent or hired, although he remains the general servant of t h e
other person.
I n s u r a n ~ R e c o v e r yon Policy.
I n this suit upon a policy of imurance, the evidence oonclusively established the defense of material misrepresentation, including the issuance of the
policy. T h e verdict in favor of the plaintiff was therefore u,nauthorized, being
contrary to the evidence and to the law, and the court erred in not granting
a ,new trial. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co. vs. Henderson. Court of
Appeals.

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
Mrs. James C. Henderson brought suit againat Jefferson Standard Life
Insurance Company on a n insurance policy issued t o Paul F. Henderson, in
which she was named as beneficiary. The defendant pleaded that the policy
was void, both because of fraud a n d because of material misrepresentations in
the application. On the trial the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant moved for a new trial, which was refused and the movant
excepted.
The application of the policy contained questions which were to be anewered by the applicant, as t o certain named diseases, and to past sickness.
The application stipulated, that every statement and representation made wes
material a n d true, and t h a t the same was made to obtain insurance, and that
t h e application was a part of the contract.
The insured died within two weeks from the &te of the application, and
within one week from the Lsuance and delivery of the policy. I t appears.
wjthout dispute, from the evidence that the insured had consulted several physicians f o r physical complaints durlng the five years preceding his application,
all of which was c o n t ~ a r yto t h e statements made in the application.
T h e court held in the case that it was not necessary that the defendant
shaw actual moral fraud on the part of t h e insured. Any material misrepresentation whereby the nature, extent, or oharacter of t h e risk was changed
avoided the policy whether made in gocnl faith or fraudulently.
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Gober's Georgia Evidence
By Judge George F. Gober, A. M., L. L. D.
Author of Georgia Form Book and Procedure, for eight years
Solicitor General of the Blue Ridge Circuit and for nineteen years
Judge of the Superior Court for said circuit. President of the Law
Department of the University of Georgia since 1925, and Teacher
of the Law of Evidence, Constitutional Law, Damages, Practice in
the Courts, etc.
Judge Gober, in his book on the law of evidence, a s applied and
enforced in Georgia has given to the bench and bar a most comprehensive treatise on this important subject. The volume contains
eleven hundred and fifty-eight pages, is well indexed, and should
serve a long needed place in the active libraries of the profession.
The text follows the code and contains the decisions of the
higher courts interpreting and construing the statutes and the common law. The book contains seventy chapters. The author begins
with the definitions of evidence, then goes into the different kinds
of evidence, the admissibility of evidence, the production of evidence, competency of witnesses, examination of witnesses, argument
of counsel, charge of the court, and, in short, into the whole realm
of evidence, with all of its shades and shadows.
There are two chapters especially, which are of exceeding importance and which are treated most admirably, Examination of
Witnesses, and Argument of Counsel. Judge Gober, in these two
chapters, has made use of his many years experience on the bench
and a t the bar and his contribution i s a masterpiece. He says of
examination of witnesses :
"The presentation of t h e evidence to the court is a n important undertaking. I t is a serious matter to the client and the lawyer. The lawyer does this
Work in the open; the public upon whom he depends in his profession, measures his poise a n d ability and how he conducts his case. A debacle will bu
notorious and he would have to redeem himself. The examiner should present himself fair and trying only to get the truth. I f he is obsessed with t h e
idea that he is smart, he should repress any impulse to show it; he should lay
aside his c u r t a n d smart sayings as he will find such things of little use and
of no current value. H e should be imperturbable and not carry his heart on
his sleeve nor his emotions on his face. I f knocked down by a n adverse ruling he should get up smiling a n d never be disconcerted from his work by anything that happens."

The examiner, the learned judge says, should exhibit and pursue
a spirit of fairness not only towards the witness, but also towards
counsel; he should know and understand thoroughly the law of his
case and the rules of evidence; he should study not only his own
side of the case, but also the other side; he should respect the court
and conform to its rulings; he should investigate the matter in
controversy, if i t be one of science or professional knowledge, and
should become conversant with the subject so a s to be able to cope
with experts on cross-examination.
The lawyer will find this book a valuable asset, especially in
actual practice, a s it can be carried into the court house and will
serve the purpose of a digest and a set of Georgia and Georgia Appeals reports and a Code. This book is published by Stein and Company, Atlanta, Ga., and is on sale a t The Harrison Co., Atlanta, Ga.
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Cases On Carriers
By Frederick Green
Professor of Law, University of Illinois
Mr. Green has given us a very exhaustive treatment of "Carriers" in his book. He has divided i t into six parts, which makes i t
more convenient for students and practitioners of the law. The six
parts are a s follows: I. Introductory Topics, 11. The Carriers Undertaking, 111. The Obligation of the Shipper, IV. The Exceptional
Liability of a Common Carrier, V. The Bills of Lading and Warehouse Receipts Act, VI. The Interstate Commerce and Public Utility
Acts. More attention is given to the fifth and sixth parts than is
ordinarily devoted to these subjects in text books on Carriers.
Clearness and accuracy have been given both in the analysis and
in the more detailed discussion. Unusual care is bestowed upon
notes, and the cases cited are well distributed among the several
states. They are not too exhaustive,-but are ample and representative. Mr. Green put special emphasis upon decisions of those courts
whose opinions seem to carry the greatest weight.
Since carriage is a peculiar undertaking and has its obligations
founded on customs, and especially customs relative t o maritime
affairs, attention has been given to maritime contracts of carriage.
This i s true also of almost all of the law of freight, of deviation,
and of duty t o protect passengers and goods from attack, and to
rescue them from peril. The vicissitudes of sea voyages, and the
early conception of a voyage a s a joint adventure of shipowner,
merchants, and mariners, lend these rules their significance.
The only objection to be found to Mr. Green's book is that the
citations of the cases are not given in the table of cases.
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Georgia Pleading and Practice
The Presentation of the Cause in the Trial Court
By William A. Ingram, LL. B.
The author, Mr. William A. Ingram, a graduate of Mercer University and a member of the Georgia Bar, i s on the editorial staff of
the Michie Company and rendered great service in the preparation
of the Georgia Code of 1926. In this work, Georgia Pleading and
Practice, he has furnished in a plain and simple, but exhaustive and
adequate manner, all the steps to be taken in a civil action or proceeding.
The volume presents a scholarly text treatment amply substantiated by footnotes containing copious references to the cases, and
to standard authorities. The Code references are to the Code of
1926. The purpose of the author is to present "the law and the reason thereof," with sufficient illustrations to indelibly impress the
reader with each particular point. From a n historical standpoint,
the book will prove invaluable, the law is traced to its source, and
i t s development shown, with comparisons between the former and
present law. Thus many obstruse and difficult problems are made
plain and intelligible.
The Georgia Law of Pleading and Practice are presented, beginning with the initial steps in the prosecution of the cause of action in the trial court, after the particular nature of the action and
the proper forum have been determined, and developing t h e procedure chronologically, step by step, to and including the rendition
of the judgment.
The volume is divided into four parts: I. The Initial Considerations, treating with the Parties, Actions, Jurisdiction, Appearances,
etc.; 11. Pleading, taking up the Introduction, Declaration and Petition, Cross-actions, Answers, Demurrers, Amendments, Dismissal,
Nonsuit, etc.; 111. Special Defenses, concerning Statutes of Frauds.
Set-Off and Recoupment, Usury, Limitations, Former Adjudication,
and other Special Defenses; IV. The Trial and Its Incidents, explaining The Introduction, Continuances, The Jury, including t h e
Issues to the Jury, The argument and conduct of Counsel, including
the open and close, The Instructions, Verdicts, and the Judgment
and Decrees.
The book though highly desirable a s a text ,is particularly recommended for its practical value to the practicing lawyer. Pleading
and practice books are in demand in all the states, and, with the
possible exception of the statutes and Code, are the most popular
local law books. I t has long been recognized t h a t the Georgia practitioner has been handicapped because of the lack of such a book on
pleading and practice. Mr. Ingram's book is a good work on pleading and practice-an exhaustive and complete treatment of the subject in text and notes.
The Publisher i s The Michie Company, Charlottesville, Virginia. The price is Ten Dollars.
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Editorials and Announcements
The Law Department of the University has had a most prosperous year. I n 1924-25, i t had ninety-one enrolled students. During
t h e present session with a prerequisite of one year of college work
i t has a n enrollment of two hundred and twenty-three. It has eighty
more students this year than last. I n the Summer School of 1926
there were twelve students; in 1927 i t had forty-four; there a r e applications of about fifty students for admission to the Summer School
of 1928. We have enrolled during the present session students from
Massachusetts, New York, Illinois, Kentucky, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida, Alabama, Tennessee, Indiana, and one
from Texas. Several students have had two years of Law a t other
schools and a r e here t o take their third year. We have two students
who have already been admitted to the E a r in Georgia and are here
taking the Senior course. The Library has been increased within
t h e last two years so t h a t t h e school has a good library of about
twelve thousand volumes. It is hoped t o add to this if means a r e
furnished so t h a t the school may be fully equipped with a library
second t o none in the South. At present the Library has the National
Reporter System, the Digest System, the Federal Reporter, Federal
Cases, t h e U. S. Supreme Court Reports, the New Federal Code, the
English Reprint, the Reports of twenty-six states up t o the Reporter
System, Georgia Reports, the American Law Reports and many others together with books on particular subjects. Courses a r e given
on International Law, Roman Law, Taxation, Public Utilities, Parliamentary Law and Psychology applied to Evidence. Two hours
each week a r e devoted to the Moot Court in which the students take
great interest. Three hours each week independent of the Moot
Court a r e devoted t o Practice in the State Courts. There is also a
course in Practice in t h e U. S. Courts taught by Prof. Upson who is
a skilled practitioner with much practical experience in the subject.
Practice in the State Courts and Evidence a r e taught by Judge Gober who had a n experience of nineteen years a s Judge of the Superior Court. He also presides in the Moot Court where almost every kind of a case is tried. The great object is to t u r n out lawyers
ready to enter t h e courts and practice law. The curriculum is
broader and requires more semester hours than any other school in
the South. Dr. Morris, Profs. McWhorter and Cornett, each teach
a number of major subjects and a r e all devoted to their work.
From t h e increased enrollment and the support and confidence
given t h e School by the E a r and people of the State the Faculty have
just reason to be proud and they feel t h a t the school will soon be the
leading law school of the South both in numbers enrolled and the
character of t h e teaching.
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Gober's Georgia Law of Automobiles
By George F. Gober, author of Gober's Form Book and Procedure, and Gober's Georgia Law of Evidence.
The above volume is about ready for the press and will be off
the press some time in July. It contains the Georgia law and statutes and also the decisions of the higher courts. I t will also embrace the traffic laws of the principal cities of the state. Since
most automobilists visit the city either on business or pleasure they
will have in this book the traffic ordinances. It is a lawyer's book
but one that can be read and understood by the layman.

